firat.sertgoz db33ea3b92 fix(security): redact credentials in HTTP tool + recording interceptor (#2529)
* fix(security): redact credentials in HTTP exchange recorder and tool

Two leak surfaces fixed in tandem so a recorded fixture can never
again ship a live token:

- `RecordingHttpInterceptor::after_response` now scrubs every recorded
  exchange in place: a curated set of credential-bearing headers
  (Authorization, Cookie, x-api-key, etc., case-insensitive) and
  query parameters (access_token, api_key, password, etc.) get
  replaced with `[REDACTED]`. Non-sensitive fields are untouched so
  replay matching still works. New unit test pins the behaviour
  against headers, query params, and Set-Cookie.

- `HttpTool` snapshots caller-supplied headers BEFORE credential
  injection and feeds the snapshot to the interceptor — injected
  Authorization/API-key values never reach the recorder even if the
  recorder's redaction list missed something. Also dedupes credential
  mappings so the same secret declared by both a WASM tool's
  capabilities and a skill's `credentials` block doesn't append two
  Authorization headers (which GitHub rejects with 401). Adds a
  redacted preview log (first/last 4 chars only) to aid triage.

* fix(security): address zmanian review — body/userinfo redaction, dedupe fix (#2529)

- Redact sensitive JSON body keys (password, secret, private_key, etc.)
  before persisting HTTP exchanges in recorded traces
- Redact URL userinfo (user:pass@host) to prevent credential leakage
- Switch dedupe key from JSON serialization to structured HashSet with
  CredentialLocation implementing Eq+Hash (avoids non-canonical key issue)
- Fix Unicode safety in secret preview (chars().count() vs byte len)
- Expand SENSITIVE_QUERY_PARAMS with auth, jwt, session
- Fix clippy ptr_arg warning on redact_headers
- Add regression tests for body scrubbing, userinfo redaction, and
  URL preservation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): address review feedback — dedupe key, unicode safety, body+userinfo redaction (#2529)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): address ilblackdragon review — exact body-key match, replay URL redaction, caller tests (#2529)

- Body-key redaction now uses exact match (not substring) to avoid
  over-redacting non-sensitive fields like token_count, input_tokens,
  session_id, auth_method.
- Replay URL comparison redacts the incoming URL before matching against
  stored (already-redacted) URLs, preventing false mismatch warnings.
- Added caller-level test (SpyInterceptor) proving HttpTool passes
  caller_headers (pre-injection snapshot) to the interceptor, so
  injected Authorization headers never reach the recorder.
- Added regression tests for credential-mapping dedup: duplicates
  removed, different locations preserved.
- Added trace warning on unparseable URL in redact_url and code comment
  linking redact_json_value to ironclaw_safety leak-detector.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): address ilblackdragon review round 2 — dedup caller test, form-urlencoded redaction, userinfo cleanup (#2529)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): snapshot URL pre-injection and redact response bodies

Close the remaining credential-leak paths into recorded traces on top
of the round-2 form-urlencoded / userinfo / dedup work.

- Snapshot `parsed_url` before the credential-injection loop mutates
  it, and hand the snapshot to the HTTP interceptor instead of the
  post-injection URL. `CredentialLocation::QueryParam`/`UrlPath`
  mappings with parameter names outside the recorder's fixed
  `SENSITIVE_QUERY_PARAMS` allowlist (e.g. `signature`, `auth_v2`)
  previously shipped raw into fixture files despite downstream
  redaction; the snapshot makes this structurally impossible.
- Call `redact_body` in `redact_exchange_response` so OAuth token
  endpoint replies like `{"access_token":"..."}` don't ship into
  committed fixtures. Request bodies were already scrubbed; this
  closes the corresponding response gap and inherits the
  form-urlencoded path added in the round-2 commit.
- Correct the `LeakDetector` references in `recording.rs` comments.
  `LeakDetector::scan` runs on response bodies upstream in
  `HttpTool::execute`, but only as a hard-block filter — values
  below its block threshold still flow through to the recorder, so
  this allowlist is the last line before the fixture file.
- Add caller-level regression tests: one driving `HttpTool::execute`
  with a `QueryParam` mapping under a non-allowlisted name to prove
  the URL snapshot works, and one asserting response bodies
  containing `access_token`/`refresh_token` are redacted before
  persistence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Illia Polosukhin <ilblackdragon@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-18 12:32:26 +09:00

IronClaw

IronClaw

Your secure personal AI assistant, always on your side

License: MIT OR Apache-2.0 Telegram: @ironclawAI Reddit: r/ironclawAI gitcgr

English | 简体中文 | Русский | 日本語 | 한국어

PhilosophyFeaturesInstallationConfigurationSecurityArchitecture


Philosophy

IronClaw is built on a simple principle: your AI assistant should work for you, not against you.

In a world where AI systems are increasingly opaque about data handling and aligned with corporate interests, IronClaw takes a different approach:

  • Your data stays yours - All information is stored locally, encrypted, and never leaves your control
  • Transparency by design - Open source, auditable, no hidden telemetry or data harvesting
  • Self-expanding capabilities - Build new tools on the fly without waiting for vendor updates
  • Defense in depth - Multiple security layers protect against prompt injection and data exfiltration

IronClaw is the AI assistant you can actually trust with your personal and professional life.

Features

Security First

  • WASM Sandbox - Untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers with capability-based permissions
  • Credential Protection - Secrets are never exposed to tools; injected at the host boundary with leak detection
  • Prompt Injection Defense - Pattern detection, content sanitization, and policy enforcement
  • Endpoint Allowlisting - HTTP requests only to explicitly approved hosts and paths

Always Available

  • Multi-channel - REPL, HTTP webhooks, WASM channels (Telegram, Slack), and web gateway
  • Docker Sandbox - Isolated container execution with per-job tokens and orchestrator/worker pattern
  • Web Gateway - Browser UI with real-time SSE/WebSocket streaming
  • Routines - Cron schedules, event triggers, webhook handlers for background automation
  • Heartbeat System - Proactive background execution for monitoring and maintenance tasks
  • Parallel Jobs - Handle multiple requests concurrently with isolated contexts
  • Self-repair - Automatic detection and recovery of stuck operations

Self-Expanding

  • Dynamic Tool Building - Describe what you need, and IronClaw builds it as a WASM tool
  • MCP Protocol - Connect to Model Context Protocol servers for additional capabilities
  • Plugin Architecture - Drop in new WASM tools and channels without restarting

Persistent Memory

  • Hybrid Search - Full-text + vector search using Reciprocal Rank Fusion
  • Workspace Filesystem - Flexible path-based storage for notes, logs, and context
  • Identity Files - Maintain consistent personality and preferences across sessions

Installation

Prerequisites

  • Rust 1.85+
  • PostgreSQL 15+ with pgvector extension
  • NEAR AI account (authentication handled via setup wizard)

Download or Build

Visit Releases page to see the latest updates.

Install via Windows Installer (Windows)

Download the Windows Installer and run it.

Install via powershell script (Windows)
irm https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.ps1 | iex
Install via shell script (macOS, Linux, Windows/WSL)
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.sh | sh
Install via Homebrew (macOS/Linux)
brew install ironclaw
Compile the source code (Cargo on Windows, Linux, macOS)

Install it with cargo, just make sure you have Rust installed on your computer.

# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw.git
cd ironclaw

# Build
cargo build --release

# Run tests
cargo test

For full release (after modifying channel sources), run ./scripts/build-all.sh to rebuild channels first.

Database Setup

# Create database
createdb ironclaw

# Enable pgvector
psql ironclaw -c "CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector;"

Configuration

Run the setup wizard to configure IronClaw:

ironclaw onboard

The wizard handles database connection, NEAR AI authentication (via browser OAuth), and secrets encryption (using your system keychain). Settings are persisted in the connected database; bootstrap variables (e.g. DATABASE_URL, LLM_BACKEND) are written to ~/.ironclaw/.env so they are available before the database connects.

Alternative LLM Providers

IronClaw defaults to NEAR AI but supports many LLM providers out of the box. Built-in providers include Anthropic, OpenAI, GitHub Copilot, Google Gemini, MiniMax, Mistral, and Ollama (local). OpenAI-compatible services like OpenRouter (300+ models), Together AI, Fireworks AI, and self-hosted servers (vLLM, LiteLLM) are also supported.

Select your provider in the wizard, or set environment variables directly:

# Example: MiniMax (built-in, 204K context)
LLM_BACKEND=minimax
MINIMAX_API_KEY=...

# Example: OpenAI-compatible endpoint
LLM_BACKEND=openai_compatible
LLM_BASE_URL=https://openrouter.ai/api/v1
LLM_API_KEY=sk-or-...
LLM_MODEL=anthropic/claude-sonnet-4

See docs/capabilities/llm-providers.md for a full provider guide.

Security

IronClaw implements defense in depth to protect your data and prevent misuse.

WASM Sandbox

All untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers:

  • Capability-based permissions - Explicit opt-in for HTTP, secrets, tool invocation
  • Endpoint allowlisting - HTTP requests only to approved hosts/paths
  • Credential injection - Secrets injected at host boundary, never exposed to WASM code
  • Leak detection - Scans requests and responses for secret exfiltration attempts
  • Rate limiting - Per-tool request limits to prevent abuse
  • Resource limits - Memory, CPU, and execution time constraints
WASM ──► Allowlist ──► Leak Scan ──► Credential ──► Execute ──► Leak Scan ──► WASM
         Validator     (request)     Injector       Request     (response)

Prompt Injection Defense

External content passes through multiple security layers:

  • Pattern-based detection of injection attempts
  • Content sanitization and escaping
  • Policy rules with severity levels (Block/Warn/Review/Sanitize)
  • Tool output wrapping for safe LLM context injection

Data Protection

  • All data stored locally in your PostgreSQL database
  • Secrets encrypted with AES-256-GCM
  • No telemetry, analytics, or data sharing
  • Full audit log of all tool executions

Architecture

┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                          Channels                              │
│  ┌──────┐  ┌──────┐   ┌─────────────┐  ┌─────────────┐         │
│  │ REPL │  │ HTTP │   │WASM Channels│  │ Web Gateway │         │
│  └──┬───┘  └──┬───┘   └──────┬──────┘  │ (SSE + WS)  │         │
│     │         │              │         └──────┬──────┘         │
│     └─────────┴──────────────┴────────────────┘                │
│                              │                                 │
│                    ┌─────────▼─────────┐                       │
│                    │    Agent Loop     │  Intent routing       │
│                    └────┬──────────┬───┘                       │
│                         │          │                           │
│              ┌──────────▼────┐  ┌──▼───────────────┐           │
│              │  Scheduler    │  │ Routines Engine  │           │
│              │(parallel jobs)│  │(cron, event, wh) │           │
│              └──────┬────────┘  └────────┬─────────┘           │
│                     │                    │                     │
│       ┌─────────────┼────────────────────┘                     │
│       │             │                                          │
│   ┌───▼─────┐  ┌────▼────────────────┐                         │
│   │ Local   │  │    Orchestrator     │                         │
│   │Workers  │  │  ┌───────────────┐  │                         │
│   │(in-proc)│  │  │ Docker Sandbox│  │                         │
│   └───┬─────┘  │  │   Containers  │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ ┌───────────┐ │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ │Worker / CC│ │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ └───────────┘ │  │                         │
│       │        │  └───────────────┘  │                         │
│       │        └─────────┬───────────┘                         │
│       └──────────────────┤                                     │
│                          │                                     │
│              ┌───────────▼──────────┐                          │
│              │    Tool Registry     │                          │
│              │  Built-in, MCP, WASM │                          │
│              └──────────────────────┘                          │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Core Components

Component Purpose
Agent Loop Main message handling and job coordination
Router Classifies user intent (command, query, task)
Scheduler Manages parallel job execution with priorities
Worker Executes jobs with LLM reasoning and tool calls
Orchestrator Container lifecycle, LLM proxying, per-job auth
Web Gateway Browser UI with chat, memory, jobs, logs, extensions, routines
Routines Engine Scheduled (cron) and reactive (event, webhook) background tasks
Workspace Persistent memory with hybrid search
Safety Layer Prompt injection defense and content sanitization

Usage

# First-time setup (configures database, auth, etc.)
ironclaw onboard

# Start interactive REPL
cargo run

# With debug logging
RUST_LOG=ironclaw=debug cargo run

Development

# Format code
cargo fmt

# Lint
cargo clippy --all --benches --tests --examples --all-features

# Run tests
createdb ironclaw_test
cargo test

# Run specific test
cargo test test_name
  • Channels: See docs/channels/overview.mdx for setup of Telegram, Discord, and other channels.
  • Changing channel sources: Run ./channels-src/telegram/build.sh before cargo build so the updated WASM is bundled.

OpenClaw Heritage

IronClaw is a Rust reimplementation inspired by OpenClaw. See FEATURE_PARITY.md for the complete tracking matrix.

Key differences:

  • Rust vs TypeScript - Native performance, memory safety, single binary
  • WASM sandbox vs Docker - Lightweight, capability-based security
  • PostgreSQL vs SQLite - Production-ready persistence
  • Security-first design - Multiple defense layers, credential protection

License

Licensed under either of:

at your option.

Description
IronClaw is OpenClaw inspired implementation in Rust focused on privacy and security IronClaw 基于一个简单的原则:你的 AI 助手应该为你服务,而不是与你为敌。
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