* fix(wasm): gate websocket runtime on auth and stop reconnect loop on fatal closes (#2557)
WASM channel runtimes spawned the websocket runtime on `connect_on_start` without
verifying required credentials, and treated auth-rejected close frames as
transient disconnects. When a Discord bot token was missing the runtime would
connect, be rejected with 4003, and the outer reconnect loop retried forever
(capped at 64s backoff) producing continuous network traffic and log spam.
Three guards, all in `src/channels/wasm/wrapper.rs`:
- `websocket_auth_preflight` + `websocket_start_decision` compose capability
parsing and secret-presence into a typed decision; `Channel::start` matches
on it and skips the spawn with a bounded `warn!` when the declared
`identify_secret_name` is not present in the secrets store. Writing the
secret and restarting the channel connects normally.
- Runtime-entry guard: if `resolve_websocket_identify_message` returns `None`
after preflight passed (credential revoked mid-flight), the task exits
instead of connecting.
- `classify_websocket_close_code` maps Discord-documented fatal auth codes
(4003, 4004, 4010-4014) to `Terminal`; the read loop breaks `'reconnect`
on terminal closes instead of falling through to backoff.
Regression tests cover preflight, start-decision, and close-code classification.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* review: address bot feedback on #2557 websocket preflight
Four distinct issues flagged by gemini-code-assist + copilot-pr-reviewer:
1. Close-code classification was global — 4000-series codes are
application-defined (RFC 6455), so another provider using e.g. 4003 with
different semantics would be incorrectly treated as terminal. Scope the
Discord code table to Discord gateway hosts via `is_discord_gateway_host`;
non-Discord URLs always return `Reconnect`.
2. Preflight silently allowed a capability that declares
`identify_secret_name` but omits the `identify` template (no identify
payload could ever be built even with a valid secret). Catch it in
`websocket_start_decision` with a new `MalformedConfig { reason }`
variant so the operator log points at the real cause.
3. `store.exists()` errors were mapped to `MissingSecret`, conflating a
transient DB blip with a genuinely absent secret. Split the `Err`
branch: log the store error and fail open (`Ready`); the runtime-entry
guard still stops any spawn whose identify payload cannot be built.
4. Runtime-entry guard warning said "required auth secret unavailable"
even when the true cause could be a missing `identify` template or a
decrypt error. Rephrased to enumerate possible causes and include
`has_identify_template` as a field.
Tests:
- `test_websocket_start_decision_malformed_config_without_identify_template`
- `test_classify_websocket_close_code_non_discord_host_never_terminal`
(covers plain non-Discord hosts and a host-suffix spoof)
- existing close-code tests now pass the URL so the Discord-gated signature
is exercised.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(wasm): use CredentialName newtype in websocket auth preflight
Per .claude/rules/types.md, names that flow between modules and gate side
effects should be typed identifiers, not `String`. The new enums from the
#2557 fix were carrying `secret_name: String` because they inherited from
`WebsocketRuntimeConfig::identify_secret_name: Option<String>` (the raw
string parsed from capability JSON). That field is a valid boundary value,
but everything below it in the auth-flow path should be typed.
- `WebsocketAuthPreflight::MissingSecret { secret_name: String }` →
`MissingCredential { credential_name: CredentialName }`
- `WebsocketStartDecision::MissingAuth { secret_name: String }` →
`MissingAuth { credential_name: CredentialName }`
- `websocket_auth_preflight` now takes `Option<&CredentialName>`; name
validation is lifted to the orchestrator where it belongs.
- `websocket_start_decision` validates `config.identify_secret_name` via
`CredentialName::new(...)` once, at the boundary. A syntactically
invalid name surfaces as `MalformedConfig { reason }` with the real
`IdentityError` embedded — not silently routed through "missing
credential", which was the exact failure mode bug #2574 fixed in a
different subsystem.
Internal variables and log field names move from `secret_name` →
`credential_name` to match the codebase convention around `CredentialName`
and the existing `credential_name` fields in `bridge::auth_manager`,
`bridge::router`, and `gate::mod`.
Out of scope (larger follow-ups):
- Capability-wire key `identify_secret_name` stays; it lives in every
installed channel's `capabilities.json` (`channels-src/discord/...`) and
renaming it is a breaking change to deployed WASM channels.
- `SecretsStore::{exists, get_decrypted}(&str, &str)` stays; migrating the
trait signature is a wider refactor that should not ride on this fix.
- `WebsocketRuntimeConfig::identify_secret_name: Option<String>` stays as
the boundary type that owns the raw-string-from-JSON contract.
Added regression test
`test_websocket_start_decision_malformed_config_with_invalid_credential_name`
to pin the new "invalid name → MalformedConfig" behavior.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* review: canonicalize identify_secret_name + flag asymmetric identify config
Two correctness issues flagged by copilot-pr-reviewer on c4b9d1d8.
1. **Canonicalization mismatch between preflight and runtime.**
`CredentialName::new()` canonicalizes — it trims whitespace and folds
`-` → `_`. Preflight checks existence via `credential_name.as_str()`
(canonical), but `resolve_websocket_identify_message` later reads the
raw `config.identify_secret_name` and passes that to the store. A
capability declaring `"github-token"` against a store holding
`"github_token"` would therefore pass preflight and fail in the spawn.
Write the canonicalized form back to `config.identify_secret_name`
before returning `Spawn(config)` so every downstream lookup uses the
same string. Regression test
`test_websocket_start_decision_spawn_canonicalizes_secret_name`.
2. **Asymmetric identify config passed through as Spawn.**
The existing check caught `identify_secret_name` without `identify`,
but the reverse (`identify` template present, `identify_secret_name`
missing) slipped through. In that shape `resolve_websocket_identify_message`
returns `None` because it needs a secret name, no Identify is ever
sent, and the peer closes the connection — the exact #2557 spin this
PR exists to prevent. Replaced the one-sided check with a
`match (identify, credential_name)` so both asymmetric shapes surface
as `MalformedConfig` with distinct reasons. Regression test
`test_websocket_start_decision_malformed_config_without_secret_name`.
No changes to wire contract, capability JSON key, or secrets-store trait.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
IronClaw
Your secure personal AI assistant, always on your side
English | 简体中文 | Русский | 日本語 | 한국어
Philosophy • Features • Installation • Configuration • Security • Architecture
Philosophy
IronClaw is built on a simple principle: your AI assistant should work for you, not against you.
In a world where AI systems are increasingly opaque about data handling and aligned with corporate interests, IronClaw takes a different approach:
- Your data stays yours - All information is stored locally, encrypted, and never leaves your control
- Transparency by design - Open source, auditable, no hidden telemetry or data harvesting
- Self-expanding capabilities - Build new tools on the fly without waiting for vendor updates
- Defense in depth - Multiple security layers protect against prompt injection and data exfiltration
IronClaw is the AI assistant you can actually trust with your personal and professional life.
Features
Security First
- WASM Sandbox - Untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers with capability-based permissions
- Credential Protection - Secrets are never exposed to tools; injected at the host boundary with leak detection
- Prompt Injection Defense - Pattern detection, content sanitization, and policy enforcement
- Endpoint Allowlisting - HTTP requests only to explicitly approved hosts and paths
Always Available
- Multi-channel - REPL, HTTP webhooks, WASM channels (Telegram, Slack), and web gateway
- Docker Sandbox - Isolated container execution with per-job tokens and orchestrator/worker pattern
- Web Gateway - Browser UI with real-time SSE/WebSocket streaming
- Routines - Cron schedules, event triggers, webhook handlers for background automation
- Heartbeat System - Proactive background execution for monitoring and maintenance tasks
- Parallel Jobs - Handle multiple requests concurrently with isolated contexts
- Self-repair - Automatic detection and recovery of stuck operations
Self-Expanding
- Dynamic Tool Building - Describe what you need, and IronClaw builds it as a WASM tool
- MCP Protocol - Connect to Model Context Protocol servers for additional capabilities
- Plugin Architecture - Drop in new WASM tools and channels without restarting
Persistent Memory
- Hybrid Search - Full-text + vector search using Reciprocal Rank Fusion
- Workspace Filesystem - Flexible path-based storage for notes, logs, and context
- Identity Files - Maintain consistent personality and preferences across sessions
Installation
Prerequisites
- Rust 1.85+
- PostgreSQL 15+ with pgvector extension
- NEAR AI account (authentication handled via setup wizard)
Download or Build
Visit Releases page to see the latest updates.
Install via Windows Installer (Windows)
Download the Windows Installer and run it.
Install via powershell script (Windows)
irm https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.ps1 | iex
Install via shell script (macOS, Linux, Windows/WSL)
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.sh | sh
Install via Homebrew (macOS/Linux)
brew install ironclaw
Compile the source code (Cargo on Windows, Linux, macOS)
Install it with cargo, just make sure you have Rust installed on your computer.
# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw.git
cd ironclaw
# Build
cargo build --release
# Run tests
cargo test
For full release (after modifying channel sources), run ./scripts/build-all.sh to rebuild channels first.
Database Setup
# Create database
createdb ironclaw
# Enable pgvector
psql ironclaw -c "CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector;"
Configuration
Run the setup wizard to configure IronClaw:
ironclaw onboard
The wizard handles database connection, NEAR AI authentication (via browser OAuth),
and secrets encryption (using your system keychain). Settings are persisted in the
connected database; bootstrap variables (e.g. DATABASE_URL, LLM_BACKEND) are
written to ~/.ironclaw/.env so they are available before the database connects.
Alternative LLM Providers
IronClaw defaults to NEAR AI but supports many LLM providers out of the box. Built-in providers include Anthropic, OpenAI, GitHub Copilot, Google Gemini, MiniMax, Mistral, and Ollama (local). OpenAI-compatible services like OpenRouter (300+ models), Together AI, Fireworks AI, and self-hosted servers (vLLM, LiteLLM) are also supported.
Select your provider in the wizard, or set environment variables directly:
# Example: MiniMax (built-in, 204K context)
LLM_BACKEND=minimax
MINIMAX_API_KEY=...
# Example: OpenAI-compatible endpoint
LLM_BACKEND=openai_compatible
LLM_BASE_URL=https://openrouter.ai/api/v1
LLM_API_KEY=sk-or-...
LLM_MODEL=anthropic/claude-sonnet-4
See docs/capabilities/llm-providers.md for a full provider guide.
Security
IronClaw implements defense in depth to protect your data and prevent misuse.
WASM Sandbox
All untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers:
- Capability-based permissions - Explicit opt-in for HTTP, secrets, tool invocation
- Endpoint allowlisting - HTTP requests only to approved hosts/paths
- Credential injection - Secrets injected at host boundary, never exposed to WASM code
- Leak detection - Scans requests and responses for secret exfiltration attempts
- Rate limiting - Per-tool request limits to prevent abuse
- Resource limits - Memory, CPU, and execution time constraints
WASM ──► Allowlist ──► Leak Scan ──► Credential ──► Execute ──► Leak Scan ──► WASM
Validator (request) Injector Request (response)
Prompt Injection Defense
External content passes through multiple security layers:
- Pattern-based detection of injection attempts
- Content sanitization and escaping
- Policy rules with severity levels (Block/Warn/Review/Sanitize)
- Tool output wrapping for safe LLM context injection
Data Protection
- All data stored locally in your PostgreSQL database
- Secrets encrypted with AES-256-GCM
- No telemetry, analytics, or data sharing
- Full audit log of all tool executions
Architecture
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Channels │
│ ┌──────┐ ┌──────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ │
│ │ REPL │ │ HTTP │ │WASM Channels│ │ Web Gateway │ │
│ └──┬───┘ └──┬───┘ └──────┬──────┘ │ (SSE + WS) │ │
│ │ │ │ └──────┬──────┘ │
│ └─────────┴──────────────┴────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌─────────▼─────────┐ │
│ │ Agent Loop │ Intent routing │
│ └────┬──────────┬───┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌──────────▼────┐ ┌──▼───────────────┐ │
│ │ Scheduler │ │ Routines Engine │ │
│ │(parallel jobs)│ │(cron, event, wh) │ │
│ └──────┬────────┘ └────────┬─────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌─────────────┼────────────────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌───▼─────┐ ┌────▼────────────────┐ │
│ │ Local │ │ Orchestrator │ │
│ │Workers │ │ ┌───────────────┐ │ │
│ │(in-proc)│ │ │ Docker Sandbox│ │ │
│ └───┬─────┘ │ │ Containers │ │ │
│ │ │ │ ┌───────────┐ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ │Worker / CC│ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ └───────────┘ │ │ │
│ │ │ └───────────────┘ │ │
│ │ └─────────┬───────────┘ │
│ └──────────────────┤ │
│ │ │
│ ┌───────────▼──────────┐ │
│ │ Tool Registry │ │
│ │ Built-in, MCP, WASM │ │
│ └──────────────────────┘ │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Core Components
| Component | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Agent Loop | Main message handling and job coordination |
| Router | Classifies user intent (command, query, task) |
| Scheduler | Manages parallel job execution with priorities |
| Worker | Executes jobs with LLM reasoning and tool calls |
| Orchestrator | Container lifecycle, LLM proxying, per-job auth |
| Web Gateway | Browser UI with chat, memory, jobs, logs, extensions, routines |
| Routines Engine | Scheduled (cron) and reactive (event, webhook) background tasks |
| Workspace | Persistent memory with hybrid search |
| Safety Layer | Prompt injection defense and content sanitization |
Usage
Engine v2 is opt-in right now. If you want to run the new engine instead of the legacy agent loop, start IronClaw with ENGINE_V2=true. See Engine v2 architecture for more details.
# First-time setup (configures database, auth, etc.)
ironclaw onboard
# Start interactive REPL
cargo run
# Start interactive REPL with engine v2
ENGINE_V2=true cargo run
# Engine v2 with debug logging
ENGINE_V2=true RUST_LOG=ironclaw=debug cargo run
Development
# Format code
cargo fmt
# Lint
cargo clippy --all --benches --tests --examples --all-features
# Run tests
createdb ironclaw_test
cargo test
# Run specific test
cargo test test_name
- Channels: See docs/channels/overview.mdx for setup of Telegram, Discord, and other channels.
- Changing channel sources: Run
./channels-src/telegram/build.shbeforecargo buildso the updated WASM is bundled.
OpenClaw Heritage
IronClaw is a Rust reimplementation inspired by OpenClaw. See FEATURE_PARITY.md for the complete tracking matrix.
Key differences:
- Rust vs TypeScript - Native performance, memory safety, single binary
- WASM sandbox vs Docker - Lightweight, capability-based security
- PostgreSQL vs SQLite - Production-ready persistence
- Security-first design - Multiple defense layers, credential protection
License
Licensed under either of:
- Apache License, Version 2.0 (LICENSE-APACHE)
- MIT License (LICENSE-MIT)
at your option.
