* refactor(gateway): hygiene batch — delete dead handler, tighten boundaries, add caller-level chat tests
Five follow-ups from the ironclaw#2599 review thread, bundled because
each is a small focused change in the same file family and the test
coverage one depends on the boundary-check one's effect (origin gate
now precedes the WS upgrade extractor, which is what lets `oneshot`
unit-test the origin rejection branch).
## 1. Delete `handlers/static_files.rs` (163 LOC dead code)
Every `pub` fn in this file had a canonical live version the router
actually wires — `platform::static_files::{health,project_*}` and
`features::{logs::logs_events_handler, status::gateway_status_handler}`
— but the stale file was left behind after the stage 4b migration. The
`#[allow(dead_code)]` annotation on `pub mod static_files;` in
`handlers/mod.rs` was a breadcrumb flagging the file for eventual
removal. Nothing imports from `handlers::static_files`, confirmed via
`rg -l handlers::static_files src/`. Safe `git rm`.
## 2. `is_local_origin` case-insensitive host match
`features/chat/mod.rs::is_local_origin` used exact-case matching on
`localhost / 127.0.0.1 / [::1]`. Browsers normalize the Origin header
to lowercase in practice, but RFC 7230 §5.4 allows uppercase
hostnames, and HTTP is case-insensitive in the scheme as well. The
helper now lowercases the whole origin string before parsing so
`http://LOCALHOST`, `HTTP://localhost`, and mixed-case variants all
resolve through the same match path. Regression test
`test_is_local_origin_accepts_uppercase` pins the uppercase cases and
spot-checks that the existing lowercase cases still pass.
## 3. `extensions_install_handler` validates `req.name` via `ExtensionName::new`
Sibling URL-path handlers (`activate`, `remove`, `setup`,
`setup_submit`) already validate at the boundary; `install` was the
last untyped entry point. The JSON-body `name` now parses through
`ExtensionName::new` before it reaches registry lookup, filesystem
path construction under `~/.ironclaw/extensions/`, or any
extension-manager call. Behavior change: paths that used to silently
reach the install pipeline and fail deep now return 400 at the
boundary with `Invalid extension name: ...`. New test
`test_extensions_install_handler_rejects_malformed_name` covers path
traversal, separators, mixed case, whitespace, and the bare `..`
case.
## 4. Refactor `chat_ws_handler` so the Origin gate runs before the WS upgrade extractor
Swap `ws: WebSocketUpgrade` for `ws: Result<WebSocketUpgrade, _>` so
axum hands the handler the raw extraction result instead of rejecting
before the body runs. This reorders the response precedence from
`extract → origin check` to `origin check → extract`, with two real
effects:
- A caller with a bad Origin now always gets `403 Forbidden`
regardless of whether they sent upgrade headers. Previously,
malformed probes without upgrade headers got `426 Upgrade Required`
— less accurate as a security signal, because it told the caller
"you're allowed here, just add these headers."
- `tower::ServiceExt::oneshot` can synthesize the new failure path
(missing `OnUpgrade` hyper extension surfaces as
`Err(WebSocketUpgradeRejection)`), which is what lets the new unit
tests exercise the three origin-gating branches without a real TCP
listener.
## 5. Add four caller-level chat handler tests
Per `.claude/rules/testing.md` ("Test Through the Caller, Not Just
the Helper") and the #2599 follow-ups explicit list. Each test drives
the handler function itself through a populated `GatewayState`
(now possible because stage-6a / #2704 promoted the state builders
into `test_helpers`):
- `test_chat_send_handler_forwards_message_to_msg_tx` — drives
`chat_send_handler`, asserts 202 ACCEPTED *and* the message lands
in the receiver end of `msg_tx`. Helper-level tests on
`web_incoming_message` alone couldn't catch a wrapper that
silently dropped the send.
- `test_chat_send_handler_returns_503_without_channel` — pins the
"channel not started" shape so a refactor that reroutes `msg_tx`
can't regress the 503.
- `test_chat_send_handler_rate_limits_after_threshold` — 30 OK then
1 × 429, covering the `PerUserRateLimiter::new(30, 60)` contract.
- `test_chat_ws_handler_{rejects_missing_origin, rejects_remote_origin,
accepts_localhost_origin}` — three origin-gating cases. The
accept path asserts 426 (Origin passed, upgrade can't complete in
oneshot) rather than 101 — the positive signal is *which* rejection
fires, not that the upgrade completes. Real 101 is still covered by
`tests/ws_gateway_integration.rs`.
- `test_chat_threads_handler_returns_in_memory_threads_without_db`
pins the DB-absent fallback branch.
- `test_chat_new_thread_handler_persists_to_db_and_session` asserts
both side effects fire (session entry + conversations row).
## Quality gate
- `cargo fmt --all`
- `cargo clippy --all --benches --tests --examples --all-features` — zero warnings
- `cargo check -p ironclaw --no-default-features --features libsql --tests` — clean
- `cargo test -p ironclaw --lib channels::web` — 456 passed (up 10 from staging baseline)
- `cargo test -p ironclaw --test multi_tenant_integration` — 40 passed
- `cargo test -p ironclaw --test ws_gateway_integration` — 11 passed
- `python3 scripts/check_gateway_boundaries.py` + test — clean, 16/16
- `bash scripts/pre-commit-safety.sh` — clean
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(gateway): address PR #2712 review feedback
Three review comments from Copilot and Gemini, grouped by issue:
## 1. Preserve `WebSocketUpgradeRejection` response verbatim (Copilot + Gemini)
`chat_ws_handler` was converting the `WebSocketUpgradeRejection` into
`(StatusCode, String)`, which discarded the rejection response's
headers and body. For `426 Upgrade Required` specifically, RFC 7231
§6.5.15 requires an `Upgrade` header field naming the protocols the
server supports — axum's rejection response includes that header, but
our hand-rolled `(status, "WebSocket upgrade failed")` error dropped
it. Same story for the `400 Bad Request` rejection variants that
include human-readable diagnostics.
Fix: change the handler's return type from
`Result<axum::response::Response, (StatusCode, String)>` to plain
`axum::response::Response`, return `rej.into_response()` verbatim
when the upgrade extractor fails, and route the two origin-rejection
early returns through `.into_response()` as well. The integration
tests in `tests/ws_gateway_integration.rs` still pass unchanged — the
successful-upgrade path routes through `ws.on_upgrade(...)` which
already returns a `Response` — and the three caller-level origin
tests keep their exact status-code assertions (403 / 403 / 426).
## 2. Timeout around `rx.recv()` in `test_chat_send_handler_forwards_message_to_msg_tx` (Copilot)
A future regression that has `chat_send_handler` return 202 without
actually sending on `msg_tx` would hang this test forever instead of
failing fast. Wrap `rx.recv()` in a 500ms `tokio::time::timeout` with
an explicit `.expect("accepted send must enqueue a message promptly")`.
## 3. Timeout around `rx.recv()` in `test_chat_send_handler_rate_limits_after_threshold` (Copilot)
Same shape as #2: the 30-iteration drain loop awaited `rx.recv()`
unbounded. A regression that returns 202-without-send would make the
loop hang. Wrap each drain in a 100ms timeout.
## Declined: `is_local_origin` whitespace trim (Gemini)
Gemini suggested trimming the origin string before `to_ascii_lowercase()`.
Not applying:
- The current path already treats whitespace-padded origins as invalid
(`strip_prefix` fails on the leading space, falls through to
`host = ""`, `matches!` returns `false`, 403). Trimming would flip
that from *reject* to *accept* for inputs like `" http://localhost"`,
which loosens the check.
- Browsers normalize the Origin header; no compliant client sends
padded origins, so the behavior change has no legitimate caller.
- The allocation concern is marginal (`"".to_ascii_lowercase()` is
essentially free, so the is-empty early-return saves nothing
measurable).
Reply on the thread will explain the reasoning.
## Quality gate
- `cargo fmt --all`
- `cargo clippy --all --benches --tests --examples --all-features` — zero warnings
- `cargo test -p ironclaw --lib channels::web` — 456 passed
- `cargo test -p ironclaw --test ws_gateway_integration` — 11 passed
- `bash scripts/pre-commit-safety.sh` — clean
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
IronClaw
Your secure personal AI assistant, always on your side
English | 简体中文 | Русский | 日本語 | 한국어
Philosophy • Features • Installation • Configuration • Security • Architecture
Philosophy
IronClaw is built on a simple principle: your AI assistant should work for you, not against you.
In a world where AI systems are increasingly opaque about data handling and aligned with corporate interests, IronClaw takes a different approach:
- Your data stays yours - All information is stored locally, encrypted, and never leaves your control
- Transparency by design - Open source, auditable, no hidden telemetry or data harvesting
- Self-expanding capabilities - Build new tools on the fly without waiting for vendor updates
- Defense in depth - Multiple security layers protect against prompt injection and data exfiltration
IronClaw is the AI assistant you can actually trust with your personal and professional life.
Features
Security First
- WASM Sandbox - Untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers with capability-based permissions
- Credential Protection - Secrets are never exposed to tools; injected at the host boundary with leak detection
- Prompt Injection Defense - Pattern detection, content sanitization, and policy enforcement
- Endpoint Allowlisting - HTTP requests only to explicitly approved hosts and paths
Always Available
- Multi-channel - REPL, HTTP webhooks, WASM channels (Telegram, Slack), and web gateway
- Docker Sandbox - Isolated container execution with per-job tokens and orchestrator/worker pattern
- Web Gateway - Browser UI with real-time SSE/WebSocket streaming
- Routines - Cron schedules, event triggers, webhook handlers for background automation
- Heartbeat System - Proactive background execution for monitoring and maintenance tasks
- Parallel Jobs - Handle multiple requests concurrently with isolated contexts
- Self-repair - Automatic detection and recovery of stuck operations
Self-Expanding
- Dynamic Tool Building - Describe what you need, and IronClaw builds it as a WASM tool
- MCP Protocol - Connect to Model Context Protocol servers for additional capabilities
- Plugin Architecture - Drop in new WASM tools and channels without restarting
Persistent Memory
- Hybrid Search - Full-text + vector search using Reciprocal Rank Fusion
- Workspace Filesystem - Flexible path-based storage for notes, logs, and context
- Identity Files - Maintain consistent personality and preferences across sessions
Installation
Prerequisites
- Rust 1.85+
- PostgreSQL 15+ with pgvector extension
- NEAR AI account (authentication handled via setup wizard)
Download or Build
Visit Releases page to see the latest updates.
Install via Windows Installer (Windows)
Download the Windows Installer and run it.
Install via powershell script (Windows)
irm https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.ps1 | iex
Install via shell script (macOS, Linux, Windows/WSL)
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.sh | sh
Install via Homebrew (macOS/Linux)
brew install ironclaw
Compile the source code (Cargo on Windows, Linux, macOS)
Install it with cargo, just make sure you have Rust installed on your computer.
# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw.git
cd ironclaw
# Build
cargo build --release
# Run tests
cargo test
For full release (after modifying channel sources), run ./scripts/build-all.sh to rebuild channels first.
Database Setup
# Create database
createdb ironclaw
# Enable pgvector
psql ironclaw -c "CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector;"
Configuration
Run the setup wizard to configure IronClaw:
ironclaw onboard
The wizard handles database connection, NEAR AI authentication (via browser OAuth),
and secrets encryption (using your system keychain). Settings are persisted in the
connected database; bootstrap variables (e.g. DATABASE_URL, LLM_BACKEND) are
written to ~/.ironclaw/.env so they are available before the database connects.
Alternative LLM Providers
IronClaw defaults to NEAR AI but supports many LLM providers out of the box. Built-in providers include Anthropic, OpenAI, GitHub Copilot, Google Gemini, MiniMax, Mistral, and Ollama (local). OpenAI-compatible services like OpenRouter (300+ models), Together AI, Fireworks AI, and self-hosted servers (vLLM, LiteLLM) are also supported.
Select your provider in the wizard, or set environment variables directly:
# Example: MiniMax (built-in, 204K context)
LLM_BACKEND=minimax
MINIMAX_API_KEY=...
# Example: OpenAI-compatible endpoint
LLM_BACKEND=openai_compatible
LLM_BASE_URL=https://openrouter.ai/api/v1
LLM_API_KEY=sk-or-...
LLM_MODEL=anthropic/claude-sonnet-4
See docs/capabilities/llm-providers.md for a full provider guide.
Security
IronClaw implements defense in depth to protect your data and prevent misuse.
WASM Sandbox
All untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers:
- Capability-based permissions - Explicit opt-in for HTTP, secrets, tool invocation
- Endpoint allowlisting - HTTP requests only to approved hosts/paths
- Credential injection - Secrets injected at host boundary, never exposed to WASM code
- Leak detection - Scans requests and responses for secret exfiltration attempts
- Rate limiting - Per-tool request limits to prevent abuse
- Resource limits - Memory, CPU, and execution time constraints
WASM ──► Allowlist ──► Leak Scan ──► Credential ──► Execute ──► Leak Scan ──► WASM
Validator (request) Injector Request (response)
Prompt Injection Defense
External content passes through multiple security layers:
- Pattern-based detection of injection attempts
- Content sanitization and escaping
- Policy rules with severity levels (Block/Warn/Review/Sanitize)
- Tool output wrapping for safe LLM context injection
Data Protection
- All data stored locally in your PostgreSQL database
- Secrets encrypted with AES-256-GCM
- No telemetry, analytics, or data sharing
- Full audit log of all tool executions
Architecture
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Channels │
│ ┌──────┐ ┌──────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ │
│ │ REPL │ │ HTTP │ │WASM Channels│ │ Web Gateway │ │
│ └──┬───┘ └──┬───┘ └──────┬──────┘ │ (SSE + WS) │ │
│ │ │ │ └──────┬──────┘ │
│ └─────────┴──────────────┴────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌─────────▼─────────┐ │
│ │ Agent Loop │ Intent routing │
│ └────┬──────────┬───┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌──────────▼────┐ ┌──▼───────────────┐ │
│ │ Scheduler │ │ Routines Engine │ │
│ │(parallel jobs)│ │(cron, event, wh) │ │
│ └──────┬────────┘ └────────┬─────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌─────────────┼────────────────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌───▼─────┐ ┌────▼────────────────┐ │
│ │ Local │ │ Orchestrator │ │
│ │Workers │ │ ┌───────────────┐ │ │
│ │(in-proc)│ │ │ Docker Sandbox│ │ │
│ └───┬─────┘ │ │ Containers │ │ │
│ │ │ │ ┌───────────┐ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ │Worker / CC│ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ └───────────┘ │ │ │
│ │ │ └───────────────┘ │ │
│ │ └─────────┬───────────┘ │
│ └──────────────────┤ │
│ │ │
│ ┌───────────▼──────────┐ │
│ │ Tool Registry │ │
│ │ Built-in, MCP, WASM │ │
│ └──────────────────────┘ │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Core Components
| Component | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Agent Loop | Main message handling and job coordination |
| Router | Classifies user intent (command, query, task) |
| Scheduler | Manages parallel job execution with priorities |
| Worker | Executes jobs with LLM reasoning and tool calls |
| Orchestrator | Container lifecycle, LLM proxying, per-job auth |
| Web Gateway | Browser UI with chat, memory, jobs, logs, extensions, routines |
| Routines Engine | Scheduled (cron) and reactive (event, webhook) background tasks |
| Workspace | Persistent memory with hybrid search |
| Safety Layer | Prompt injection defense and content sanitization |
Usage
Engine v2 is opt-in right now. If you want to run the new engine instead of the legacy agent loop, start IronClaw with ENGINE_V2=true. See Engine v2 architecture for more details.
# First-time setup (configures database, auth, etc.)
ironclaw onboard
# Start interactive REPL
cargo run
# Start interactive REPL with engine v2
ENGINE_V2=true cargo run
# Engine v2 with debug logging
ENGINE_V2=true RUST_LOG=ironclaw=debug cargo run
Development
# Format code
cargo fmt
# Lint
cargo clippy --all --benches --tests --examples --all-features
# Run tests
createdb ironclaw_test
cargo test
# Run specific test
cargo test test_name
- Channels: See docs/channels/overview.mdx for setup of Telegram, Discord, and other channels.
- Changing channel sources: Run
./channels-src/telegram/build.shbeforecargo buildso the updated WASM is bundled.
OpenClaw Heritage
IronClaw is a Rust reimplementation inspired by OpenClaw. See FEATURE_PARITY.md for the complete tracking matrix.
Key differences:
- Rust vs TypeScript - Native performance, memory safety, single binary
- WASM sandbox vs Docker - Lightweight, capability-based security
- PostgreSQL vs SQLite - Production-ready persistence
- Security-first design - Multiple defense layers, credential protection
License
Licensed under either of:
- Apache License, Version 2.0 (LICENSE-APACHE)
- MIT License (LICENSE-MIT)
at your option.
