Illia Polosukhin a524bf8aee refactor(gateway): stage 4b slices + empty allowlist — ironclaw#2599 (#2665)
* refactor(gateway): stage 4b slices + empty allowlist — ironclaw#2599

Collapses the last pre-existing back-edges tracked by the boundary
checker and moves the first three small feature slices out of
server.rs.

Stage 4b slices:

- features/logs/       — /api/logs/events, /api/logs/level (GET/PUT)
- features/pairing/    — /api/pairing/{channel} (GET),
                         /api/pairing/{channel}/approve (POST)
- features/status/     — /api/gateway/status (+ GatewayStatusResponse,
                         ModelUsageEntry, each now owned by the slice)

Platform extensions (co-located with existing platform modules so
every caller — handlers/, features/, and the still-shrinking
server.rs — can reach them without a back-edge):

- platform/legacy_auth.rs:
  - handle_legacy_auth_token_submission
  - handle_legacy_auth_cancel
  - clear_auth_mode, clear_auth_mode_for_thread
  Consumers: server.rs chat HTTP shims + platform/ws.rs.
- platform/engine_dispatch.rs:
  - dispatch_engine_submission
  - dispatch_engine_external_callback
  - dispatch_onboarding_ready_followup  (now takes &ExtensionName)
  Consumers: server.rs chat + extensions_setup_submit + features/pairing.
- platform/static_files.rs gains the workspace-backed layout/widget
  readers (read_layout_config, load_resolved_widgets,
  read_widget_manifest, LAYOUT_PATH, WIDGETS_DIR, MAX_WIDGET_* caps).
  handlers/frontend.rs imports them back from platform.

ExtensionName adoption:

- Deletes sanitize_extension_name and its 5 unit tests from
  server.rs. The defensive "never fails, returns 'unknown'" helper is
  replaced with ironclaw_common::ExtensionName validation at the one
  untrusted boundary we still expose (pairing_approve_handler's URL
  path). Invalid names now return 400 at the handler — the old
  behavior sanitized injection-shaped input into a safe-but-nonsense
  string that would never have matched a real extension anyway, so
  this is strictly better telemetry with no loss of reachable
  behavior. Registry-sourced names (derive_onboarding in
  handlers/extensions.rs) drop the sanitize call entirely; the
  comment notes a follow-up to type Extension.name as ExtensionName
  directly.
- Other shared helpers that needed to leave server.rs as collateral:
  images_to_attachments moves to web/util.rs alongside the other
  pure message-building helpers.

ws.rs cleanup:

- Switches GatewayState / PerUserRateLimiter / RateLimiter /
  ActiveConfigSnapshot imports from the server.rs re-export path to
  crate::channels::web::platform::state directly, removing the last
  state-type allowlist entries.

Allowlist:

- scripts/check_gateway_boundaries.py: ALLOWLIST is now empty. All
  eight pre-existing entries (widget helpers, seven ws.rs shim
  symbols) are gone — every relocation landed in platform/. The
  allowlist mechanism stays in place for future narrowly-scoped
  exceptions.

Diff is roughly −700 lines net from server.rs (now ~5,700 down
from ~6,300), spread across three new feature-slice files and two
new platform modules. No behavior change — this is a pure
relocation + one type-boundary upgrade.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(gateway): lock in pairing boundary tests + tighten layout helper visibility — PR #2665

Two valid findings from the PR #2665 review:

- `read_layout_config` was carried over from `handlers/frontend.rs` as
  `pub`, but every caller lives inside `src/channels/web/`. Tightened
  to `pub(crate)` to match the rest of the workspace/widget helpers in
  the same module (Copilot).
- Added regression coverage for the new 400 boundary in
  `features/pairing/` — `parse_channel` now has 8 unit tests pinning
  that it accepts the lowercase / snake_case shapes pairing uses and
  lowercases mixed-case URL paths, and that it rejects empty, path
  traversal, invalid chars, consecutive underscores, edge
  underscores, and oversized input with `StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST`.
  This locks in the stricter contract the PR introduced so a future
  edit can't accidentally regress to silent canonicalization (Copilot).

The third review note (Gemini: `engine_v2` + `engine_v2_enabled`
redundancy in `GatewayStatusResponse`) is a pre-existing wire-contract
shape — `crates/ironclaw_gateway/static/app.js:8120` reads
`engine_v2` and `app.js:8130` reads `engine_v2_enabled`, so dropping
either field without a coordinated frontend change would regress the
browser UI. Out of scope for this PR's pure relocation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(gateway): parse_channel preserves hyphens for slack-relay — PR #2665 review

Copilot's round-2 review caught a real regression I introduced in this
PR: `parse_channel` returned `ExtensionName::new(...)` directly, and
`ExtensionName`'s canonical form folds `-` into `_`. The pairing store
(via `crate::pairing::normalize_channel_name` in `src/pairing/mod.rs`)
only lowercases — it does *not* fold hyphens — so the live WASM channel
`slack-relay` (see `src/channels/wasm/setup.rs` and
`crate::channels::relay::DEFAULT_RELAY_NAME`) stores hyphenated rows
that a folded `slack_relay` query would silently miss. Empty pairing
lists and failed approvals for every `slack-relay` code.

Fix: keep `ExtensionName::new` at the boundary for its rejection
semantics (path traversal, invalid chars, oversize, edge/consecutive
underscores) but discard the typed value. `parse_channel` now returns
the pre-fold lowercased `String`, which flows directly into
`pairing_store.list_pending` / `approve` and
`ext_mgr.complete_pairing_approval`. The two AppEvent / dispatch call
sites that need a typed `ExtensionName` wrap via
`ExtensionName::from_trusted` — same escape hatch staging's
`pairing_approve_handler` was using before this PR moved it. The
module docstring spells out why the discard-and-keep-the-raw-string
dance exists.

Regression test added (`parse_channel_preserves_hyphens_for_slack_relay`)
pinning both `slack-relay` and `SLACK-RELAY` round-trip through
`parse_channel` as `slack-relay`. Existing tests updated for the new
`Result<String, _>` return type. 9 tests pass.

Also fixed a stale comment in `platform/router.rs` (Copilot): the
"feature handlers still inline in server.rs pending migration" note
predated the logs/oauth/pairing/status slices being extracted. Rewrote
to describe the current split. And dropped the forward-looking
`derive_onboarding` comment about typing `Extension.name` as
`ExtensionName` — this PR just demonstrated that such a naive swap
would break `slack-relay` and related hyphenated channels, so the
follow-up is larger than "type the field".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 22:51:21 +09:00
2026-02-04 22:09:52 -08:00
2026-02-22 19:08:43 +00:00
2026-02-22 19:08:43 +00:00
2026-02-21 15:14:57 -07:00
2026-04-09 14:18:30 +02:00
2026-04-09 14:18:30 +02:00
2026-04-09 14:18:30 +02:00
2026-04-09 14:18:30 +02:00

IronClaw

IronClaw

Your secure personal AI assistant, always on your side

License: MIT OR Apache-2.0 Telegram: @ironclawAI Reddit: r/ironclawAI gitcgr

English | 简体中文 | Русский | 日本語 | 한국어

PhilosophyFeaturesInstallationConfigurationSecurityArchitecture


Philosophy

IronClaw is built on a simple principle: your AI assistant should work for you, not against you.

In a world where AI systems are increasingly opaque about data handling and aligned with corporate interests, IronClaw takes a different approach:

  • Your data stays yours - All information is stored locally, encrypted, and never leaves your control
  • Transparency by design - Open source, auditable, no hidden telemetry or data harvesting
  • Self-expanding capabilities - Build new tools on the fly without waiting for vendor updates
  • Defense in depth - Multiple security layers protect against prompt injection and data exfiltration

IronClaw is the AI assistant you can actually trust with your personal and professional life.

Features

Security First

  • WASM Sandbox - Untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers with capability-based permissions
  • Credential Protection - Secrets are never exposed to tools; injected at the host boundary with leak detection
  • Prompt Injection Defense - Pattern detection, content sanitization, and policy enforcement
  • Endpoint Allowlisting - HTTP requests only to explicitly approved hosts and paths

Always Available

  • Multi-channel - REPL, HTTP webhooks, WASM channels (Telegram, Slack), and web gateway
  • Docker Sandbox - Isolated container execution with per-job tokens and orchestrator/worker pattern
  • Web Gateway - Browser UI with real-time SSE/WebSocket streaming
  • Routines - Cron schedules, event triggers, webhook handlers for background automation
  • Heartbeat System - Proactive background execution for monitoring and maintenance tasks
  • Parallel Jobs - Handle multiple requests concurrently with isolated contexts
  • Self-repair - Automatic detection and recovery of stuck operations

Self-Expanding

  • Dynamic Tool Building - Describe what you need, and IronClaw builds it as a WASM tool
  • MCP Protocol - Connect to Model Context Protocol servers for additional capabilities
  • Plugin Architecture - Drop in new WASM tools and channels without restarting

Persistent Memory

  • Hybrid Search - Full-text + vector search using Reciprocal Rank Fusion
  • Workspace Filesystem - Flexible path-based storage for notes, logs, and context
  • Identity Files - Maintain consistent personality and preferences across sessions

Installation

Prerequisites

  • Rust 1.85+
  • PostgreSQL 15+ with pgvector extension
  • NEAR AI account (authentication handled via setup wizard)

Download or Build

Visit Releases page to see the latest updates.

Install via Windows Installer (Windows)

Download the Windows Installer and run it.

Install via powershell script (Windows)
irm https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.ps1 | iex
Install via shell script (macOS, Linux, Windows/WSL)
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.sh | sh
Install via Homebrew (macOS/Linux)
brew install ironclaw
Compile the source code (Cargo on Windows, Linux, macOS)

Install it with cargo, just make sure you have Rust installed on your computer.

# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw.git
cd ironclaw

# Build
cargo build --release

# Run tests
cargo test

For full release (after modifying channel sources), run ./scripts/build-all.sh to rebuild channels first.

Database Setup

# Create database
createdb ironclaw

# Enable pgvector
psql ironclaw -c "CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector;"

Configuration

Run the setup wizard to configure IronClaw:

ironclaw onboard

The wizard handles database connection, NEAR AI authentication (via browser OAuth), and secrets encryption (using your system keychain). Settings are persisted in the connected database; bootstrap variables (e.g. DATABASE_URL, LLM_BACKEND) are written to ~/.ironclaw/.env so they are available before the database connects.

Alternative LLM Providers

IronClaw defaults to NEAR AI but supports many LLM providers out of the box. Built-in providers include Anthropic, OpenAI, GitHub Copilot, Google Gemini, MiniMax, Mistral, and Ollama (local). OpenAI-compatible services like OpenRouter (300+ models), Together AI, Fireworks AI, and self-hosted servers (vLLM, LiteLLM) are also supported.

Select your provider in the wizard, or set environment variables directly:

# Example: MiniMax (built-in, 204K context)
LLM_BACKEND=minimax
MINIMAX_API_KEY=...

# Example: OpenAI-compatible endpoint
LLM_BACKEND=openai_compatible
LLM_BASE_URL=https://openrouter.ai/api/v1
LLM_API_KEY=sk-or-...
LLM_MODEL=anthropic/claude-sonnet-4

See docs/capabilities/llm-providers.md for a full provider guide.

Security

IronClaw implements defense in depth to protect your data and prevent misuse.

WASM Sandbox

All untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers:

  • Capability-based permissions - Explicit opt-in for HTTP, secrets, tool invocation
  • Endpoint allowlisting - HTTP requests only to approved hosts/paths
  • Credential injection - Secrets injected at host boundary, never exposed to WASM code
  • Leak detection - Scans requests and responses for secret exfiltration attempts
  • Rate limiting - Per-tool request limits to prevent abuse
  • Resource limits - Memory, CPU, and execution time constraints
WASM ──► Allowlist ──► Leak Scan ──► Credential ──► Execute ──► Leak Scan ──► WASM
         Validator     (request)     Injector       Request     (response)

Prompt Injection Defense

External content passes through multiple security layers:

  • Pattern-based detection of injection attempts
  • Content sanitization and escaping
  • Policy rules with severity levels (Block/Warn/Review/Sanitize)
  • Tool output wrapping for safe LLM context injection

Data Protection

  • All data stored locally in your PostgreSQL database
  • Secrets encrypted with AES-256-GCM
  • No telemetry, analytics, or data sharing
  • Full audit log of all tool executions

Architecture

┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                          Channels                              │
│  ┌──────┐  ┌──────┐   ┌─────────────┐  ┌─────────────┐         │
│  │ REPL │  │ HTTP │   │WASM Channels│  │ Web Gateway │         │
│  └──┬───┘  └──┬───┘   └──────┬──────┘  │ (SSE + WS)  │         │
│     │         │              │         └──────┬──────┘         │
│     └─────────┴──────────────┴────────────────┘                │
│                              │                                 │
│                    ┌─────────▼─────────┐                       │
│                    │    Agent Loop     │  Intent routing       │
│                    └────┬──────────┬───┘                       │
│                         │          │                           │
│              ┌──────────▼────┐  ┌──▼───────────────┐           │
│              │  Scheduler    │  │ Routines Engine  │           │
│              │(parallel jobs)│  │(cron, event, wh) │           │
│              └──────┬────────┘  └────────┬─────────┘           │
│                     │                    │                     │
│       ┌─────────────┼────────────────────┘                     │
│       │             │                                          │
│   ┌───▼─────┐  ┌────▼────────────────┐                         │
│   │ Local   │  │    Orchestrator     │                         │
│   │Workers  │  │  ┌───────────────┐  │                         │
│   │(in-proc)│  │  │ Docker Sandbox│  │                         │
│   └───┬─────┘  │  │   Containers  │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ ┌───────────┐ │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ │Worker / CC│ │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ └───────────┘ │  │                         │
│       │        │  └───────────────┘  │                         │
│       │        └─────────┬───────────┘                         │
│       └──────────────────┤                                     │
│                          │                                     │
│              ┌───────────▼──────────┐                          │
│              │    Tool Registry     │                          │
│              │  Built-in, MCP, WASM │                          │
│              └──────────────────────┘                          │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Core Components

Component Purpose
Agent Loop Main message handling and job coordination
Router Classifies user intent (command, query, task)
Scheduler Manages parallel job execution with priorities
Worker Executes jobs with LLM reasoning and tool calls
Orchestrator Container lifecycle, LLM proxying, per-job auth
Web Gateway Browser UI with chat, memory, jobs, logs, extensions, routines
Routines Engine Scheduled (cron) and reactive (event, webhook) background tasks
Workspace Persistent memory with hybrid search
Safety Layer Prompt injection defense and content sanitization

Usage

# First-time setup (configures database, auth, etc.)
ironclaw onboard

# Start interactive REPL
cargo run

# With debug logging
RUST_LOG=ironclaw=debug cargo run

Development

# Format code
cargo fmt

# Lint
cargo clippy --all --benches --tests --examples --all-features

# Run tests
createdb ironclaw_test
cargo test

# Run specific test
cargo test test_name
  • Channels: See docs/channels/overview.mdx for setup of Telegram, Discord, and other channels.
  • Changing channel sources: Run ./channels-src/telegram/build.sh before cargo build so the updated WASM is bundled.

OpenClaw Heritage

IronClaw is a Rust reimplementation inspired by OpenClaw. See FEATURE_PARITY.md for the complete tracking matrix.

Key differences:

  • Rust vs TypeScript - Native performance, memory safety, single binary
  • WASM sandbox vs Docker - Lightweight, capability-based security
  • PostgreSQL vs SQLite - Production-ready persistence
  • Security-first design - Multiple defense layers, credential protection

License

Licensed under either of:

at your option.

Description
IronClaw is OpenClaw inspired implementation in Rust focused on privacy and security IronClaw 基于一个简单的原则:你的 AI 助手应该为你服务,而不是与你为敌。
Readme 1.8 GiB
Languages
Rust 86%
Python 7.5%
JavaScript 3.4%
Shell 1.9%
CSS 0.9%
Other 0.2%