58529a20a8
`write_standalone_secret_master_key` restricted the key file by shelling out
to `icacls` with `.status()`, which lets the child inherit our stdio. On
success `icacls` announces itself:
processed file: C:\...\reborn-local-dev-secrets-master-key
Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files
Runtime assembly runs before a CLI command prints its own result, so that
banner landed at the front of `ironclaw.exe`'s stdout and corrupted every
`--json` command that builds a runtime:
SmokeFailure: extension search --json did not emit valid JSON:
Expecting value: line 1 column 1 (char 0)
Character 0 was the `p` of `processed`. The command exited 0 and its JSON was
intact — just no longer the only thing on stdout.
`profile list --json` passed in the same run because it is pure in-process
(`RebornProfile::all()` plus a `println!`) and never assembles a runtime. The
Unix branch is unaffected: it sets `mode(0o600)` at open and spawns nothing.
This is the only subprocess anywhere in the boot path.
It fires on essentially every fresh run: no cached key file, no
IRONCLAW_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY override, and IRONCLAW_DISABLE_OS_KEYCHAIN makes
the keychain miss deterministic, so the generate-fresh-key branch is taken.
Switched to `output()`, which captures both pipes. That keeps the child's
chatter out of our stdout contract and lets the failure path report what
icacls actually said instead of only its exit status.
Also hardens the smoke harness that found this, because it discarded the
evidence: a JSON parse failure now echoes the length and repr of what
arrived, exit-0-with-empty-stdout is called out by name with stderr attached,
and subprocess output is decoded as UTF-8 explicitly rather than through
Python's locale encoding (the ANSI code page on Windows, which would mangle
any non-ASCII byte in a payload we are about to parse).
Regression coverage is at the smoke tier, which is where this class is
actually reachable — the three new harness tests pin that a leading banner, a
BOM, and a silent success each name themselves. There is no Windows Rust test
lane that reaches this code; #7182 added the only Windows test execution in
CI and it is scoped to ironclaw_filesystem. The changed expressions were
type-checked standalone on the host, since #[cfg(windows)] hides them from
every local build and cross-compiling the crate fails in ring's C build.
Found by release preflight run 30962170467 on release/1.1.0-rc.1.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
IronClaw
Your secure personal AI assistant, always on your side
English | 简体中文 | Русский | 日本語 | 한국어
Quick Start • Philosophy • Features • Installation • Configuration • Security • Architecture
Quick Start
Choose an ironclaw-v* tag from the Releases page,
then install it on macOS, Linux, or Windows/WSL. Replace X.Y.Z with the
selected version, including any prerelease suffix:
IRONCLAW_RELEASE_TAG=ironclaw-vX.Y.Z
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf \
"https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/download/${IRONCLAW_RELEASE_TAG}/ironclaw-installer.sh" | sh
Then run the guided setup:
ironclaw onboard
Choose an LLM provider, enter its API key in the hidden prompt, and accept the default model or enter another one. IronClaw provisions its local configuration, encrypted credential store, and WebUI login token. On macOS and Linux it also installs and starts the background service, then prints a link that opens the WebUI.
Use ironclaw status to check the service and print the login link again.
Windows users can start the WebUI in the foreground with ironclaw serve.
See Installation for Windows installers and source builds.
Philosophy
IronClaw is built on a simple principle: your AI assistant should work for you, not against you.
In a world where AI systems are increasingly opaque about data handling and aligned with corporate interests, IronClaw takes a different approach:
- Your data stays yours - All information is stored locally, encrypted, and never leaves your control
- Transparency by design - Open source, auditable, no hidden telemetry or data harvesting
- Self-expanding capabilities - Build new tools on the fly without waiting for vendor updates
- Defense in depth - Multiple security layers protect against prompt injection and data exfiltration
IronClaw is the AI assistant you can actually trust with your personal and professional life.
Features
Security First
- WASM Sandbox - Untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers with capability-based permissions
- Credential Protection - Secrets are never exposed to tools; injected at the host boundary with leak detection
- Prompt Injection Defense - Pattern detection, content sanitization, and policy enforcement
- Endpoint Allowlisting - HTTP requests only to explicitly approved hosts and paths
Always Available
- Multi-channel - REPL, HTTP webhooks, WASM channels (Telegram, Slack), and web gateway
- Docker Sandbox - Isolated container execution with per-job tokens and orchestrator/worker pattern
- Web Gateway - Browser UI with real-time SSE/WebSocket streaming
- Routines - Cron schedules, event triggers, webhook handlers for background automation
- Heartbeat System - Proactive background execution for monitoring and maintenance tasks
- Parallel Jobs - Handle multiple requests concurrently with isolated contexts
- Self-repair - Automatic detection and recovery of stuck operations
Self-Expanding
- Dynamic Tool Building - Describe what you need, and IronClaw builds it as a WASM tool
- MCP Protocol - Connect to Model Context Protocol servers for additional capabilities
- Plugin Architecture - Drop in new WASM tools and channels without restarting
Persistent Memory
- Hybrid Search - Full-text + vector search using Reciprocal Rank Fusion
- Workspace Filesystem - Flexible path-based storage for notes, logs, and context
- Identity Files - Maintain consistent personality and preferences across sessions
Installation
The Releases page provides pre-built binaries and installers.
Install via Windows Installer (Windows)
Open the selected ironclaw-v* release, download
ironclaw-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.msi, and run it.
Install via PowerShell script (Windows)
$IronClawReleaseTag = "ironclaw-vX.Y.Z"
irm "https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/download/$IronClawReleaseTag/ironclaw-installer.ps1" | iex
Install via shell script (macOS, Linux, Windows/WSL)
IRONCLAW_RELEASE_TAG=ironclaw-vX.Y.Z
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf \
"https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/download/${IRONCLAW_RELEASE_TAG}/ironclaw-installer.sh" | sh
Build and install from source
Source builds require Rust 1.96+ and Node.js 22+ with Corepack/pnpm.
git clone https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw.git
cd ironclaw
corepack enable pnpm
cargo install --locked --path crates/ironclaw_reborn_cli
Configuration
ironclaw onboard is the primary configuration path. It writes Reborn state
under $HOME/.ironclaw/reborn by default, stores the selected LLM credential
in the encrypted local secret store, and preserves existing configuration when
it is run again.
Inspect the current setup with:
ironclaw status
ironclaw models status
ironclaw config list
To switch providers after onboarding, select the route and then store its API key using the hidden prompt:
ironclaw models set-provider openai --model gpt-5-mini
ironclaw config set openai.api_key
Additional settings use the same command. For example:
ironclaw config set google.client_id YOUR_CLIENT_ID
ironclaw config set google.client_secret
ironclaw config set google.redirect_uri YOUR_REDIRECT_URI
ironclaw config set webui.token --rotate
Secret values never accept a positional argument; IronClaw prompts for them without echoing the value. Configure Slack credentials and channel mappings from the WebUI Extensions page. To enable its route from the CLI, use:
ironclaw config set slack.enabled true
ironclaw service restart
Configuration writes never restart the service automatically. Run
ironclaw service restart after a change that affects the running service,
and use ironclaw config set --help for the complete list of supported keys.
Security
IronClaw implements defense in depth to protect your data and prevent misuse.
WASM Sandbox
All untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers:
- Capability-based permissions - Explicit opt-in for HTTP, secrets, tool invocation
- Endpoint allowlisting - HTTP requests only to approved hosts/paths
- Credential injection - Secrets injected at host boundary, never exposed to WASM code
- Leak detection - Scans requests and responses for secret exfiltration attempts
- Rate limiting - Per-tool request limits to prevent abuse
- Resource limits - Memory, CPU, and execution time constraints
WASM ──► Allowlist ──► Leak Scan ──► Credential ──► Execute ──► Leak Scan ──► WASM
Validator (request) Injector Request (response)
Prompt Injection Defense
External content passes through multiple security layers:
- Pattern-based detection of injection attempts
- Content sanitization and escaping
- Policy rules with severity levels (Block/Warn/Review/Sanitize)
- Tool output wrapping for safe LLM context injection
Data Protection
- All data stored locally in IronClaw's application state
- Secrets encrypted with AES-256-GCM
- No telemetry, analytics, or data sharing
- Full audit log of all tool executions
Architecture
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Channels │
│ ┌──────┐ ┌──────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ │
│ │ REPL │ │ HTTP │ │WASM Channels│ │ Web Gateway │ │
│ └──┬───┘ └──┬───┘ └──────┬──────┘ │ (SSE + WS) │ │
│ │ │ │ └──────┬──────┘ │
│ └─────────┴──────────────┴────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌─────────▼─────────┐ │
│ │ Agent Loop │ Intent routing │
│ └────┬──────────┬───┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌──────────▼────┐ ┌──▼───────────────┐ │
│ │ Scheduler │ │ Routines Engine │ │
│ │(parallel jobs)│ │(cron, event, wh) │ │
│ └──────┬────────┘ └────────┬─────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌─────────────┼────────────────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌───▼─────┐ ┌────▼────────────────┐ │
│ │ Local │ │ Orchestrator │ │
│ │Workers │ │ ┌───────────────┐ │ │
│ │(in-proc)│ │ │ Docker Sandbox│ │ │
│ └───┬─────┘ │ │ Containers │ │ │
│ │ │ │ ┌───────────┐ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ │Worker / CC│ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ └───────────┘ │ │ │
│ │ │ └───────────────┘ │ │
│ │ └─────────┬───────────┘ │
│ └──────────────────┤ │
│ │ │
│ ┌───────────▼──────────┐ │
│ │ Tool Registry │ │
│ │ Built-in, MCP, WASM │ │
│ └──────────────────────┘ │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Core Components
| Component | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Agent Loop | Main message handling and job coordination |
| Router | Classifies user intent (command, query, task) |
| Scheduler | Manages parallel job execution with priorities |
| Worker | Executes jobs with LLM reasoning and tool calls |
| Orchestrator | Container lifecycle, LLM proxying, per-job auth |
| Web Gateway | Browser UI with chat, memory, jobs, logs, extensions, routines |
| Routines Engine | Scheduled (cron) and reactive (event, webhook) background tasks |
| Workspace | Persistent memory with hybrid search |
| Safety Layer | Prompt injection defense and content sanitization |
Usage
# Check the background service and print the WebUI login link
ironclaw status
# Start an interactive terminal session
ironclaw repl
# Run one turn
ironclaw run --message "hello"
Development
# Format code
cargo fmt
# Lint
cargo clippy --all --benches --tests --examples --all-features
# Run tests
createdb ironclaw_test
cargo test
# Run specific test
cargo test test_name
- Channels: See docs/channels/overview.mdx for setup of Telegram, Discord, and other channels.
OpenClaw Heritage
IronClaw is a Rust reimplementation inspired by OpenClaw. See FEATURE_PARITY.md for the complete tracking matrix.
Key differences:
- Rust vs TypeScript - Native performance, memory safety, single binary
- WASM sandbox vs Docker - Lightweight, capability-based security
- PostgreSQL vs SQLite - Production-ready persistence
- Security-first design - Multiple defense layers, credential protection
License
Licensed under either of:
- Apache License, Version 2.0 (LICENSE-APACHE)
- MIT License (LICENSE-MIT)
at your option.