* fix: bug bash 4/16 triage — error boundary, TEE secrets, pairing, rehydration Addresses six bug-bash tickets that cluster into five focused fixes. Grouped into one commit because the changes are all small, independent, and share the same release window — split per-file reviewability is preserved by the touched-surface list below and each change carries a regression test. - #2540 — Orchestrator VM timeout is now configurable via `IRONCLAW_ORCHESTRATOR_MAX_DURATION_SECS` (30..=3600s, default 300s). Timeout, memory-limit, and Python-traceback errors map to user-safe messages instead of leaking the Monty interpreter's internal trace. - #1994, #2546 — New `LlmError::BadGateway { provider, status, retry_after }` variant. Upstream 502/503/504 from `nearai_chat` now map here (body logged at debug, never carried on the error) and are retried by `RetryProvider` + counted transient by the circuit breaker. Root cause of #2546's raw-traceback leak was the response body being wrapped into `RequestFailed.reason` and nested three layers deep on the way out; that path is gone. - #1537 — `AppBuilder::init_secrets` always installs a secrets store: persistent when the master key + DB handles resolve, ephemeral in-memory otherwise. This mirrors the ExtensionManager fallback so `WasmToolLoader` and `setup_wasm_channels` get a store on hosted TEE deployments where `SECRETS_MASTER_KEY` is absent, restoring the fail-closed credential-injection path instead of silently dropping into unauthenticated HTTP. - #1839 — Slack `chat.postMessage` returns HTTP 200 on scope/token failures with `{"ok": false, "error": ...}` in the body. Response parsing was extracted into a testable `slack_post_message_result` helper that now surfaces the failure, and `send_pairing_reply` errors are logged with scope guidance (`chat:write`, `im:write`) instead of being swallowed by `let _ = ...`. - #1993 — Chat rehydration's `reconcile_in_progress_with_turns` now requires BOTH a final response AND all recorded tool calls having `has_result && !has_error` before dropping the in-progress flag. Previously a 502 mid-turn would persist the agent's "Done!" claim while the tool call errored, and reopen showed fabricated success. The deeper fix (engine-v2 side-effect gate for the forward path at #2544 / #2541) is a follow-up. Touched surfaces: - channels-src/slack/src/lib.rs - crates/ironclaw_engine/src/executor/orchestrator.rs - src/app.rs - src/channels/web/features/chat/mod.rs - src/llm/{error,nearai_chat,retry,circuit_breaker}.rs Regression tests: - `orchestrator::tests::failure_reason_*` (4 cases covering timeout, memory limit, traceback strip, pass-through) - `llm::retry::tests::test_is_retryable_classification` (BadGateway arm) - `app::tests::ephemeral_secrets_store_is_constructible_and_usable` - `slack::tests::slack_post_message_result_{accepts,rejects,empty}` - `chat::tests::test_reconcile_retains_in_progress_when_tool_call_failed` Out of scope / deferred: - #2544, #2541 — engine-v2 hard side-effect gate (documented as aspirational in `.claude/rules/tool-evidence.md`; design belongs in its own PR). - #2437 — closed upstream, no code change; see https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/issues/2437#issuecomment-4282541384 - #2543 — likely fixed by #2515, needs retest on staging. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(tee): surface persistent-store failures and probe in doctor Follow-up to the #1537 ephemeral-store fallback. The fallback alone doesn't tell an operator *why* the persistent store is missing on a hosted TEE — that was #1537's real ergonomic pain. Three diagnostic improvements: 1. `install_ephemeral_secrets_store` now takes a `reason` tag and logs at `warn!` with the specific path (no master key / crypto failure / no DB handles / feature-flag mismatch / unexpected create_secrets_store None). Previously the install was silent at `debug!`, so operators had no signal the fallback had fired. 2. `ironclaw doctor`'s `check_secrets` now runs the same `SecretsConfig::resolve` path `AppBuilder::init_secrets` uses, then calls `create_secrets_store` to probe that the backing store is actually reachable. The old check only read `settings.secrets_master_key_source`, which misses the exact hosted-TEE failure mode: master key resolves to `Env`/`Keychain` but the DB handle isn't wired, so the store factory returns None and runtime silently falls back to ephemeral. 3. `src/db/CLAUDE.md` note claiming `LibSqlSecretsStore` is "not plumbed through the main startup path" was stale — the factory dispatches on `DatabaseHandles` (init_secrets path) and `DatabaseBackend` (CLI helper) and both wire libSQL. Note updated to reflect the actual wiring plus the #1537 ephemeral-fallback contract. The two existing `check_secrets` unit tests asserted the old settings- only behavior; rewritten as "does-not-panic" checks because the new function reads real env and the outcome is test-host dependent (matches the shape of `check_docker_daemon_does_not_panic`). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(llm,app): address PR #2753 review comments Three fixes from Copilot + Gemini review on PR #2753: 1. **BadGateway retry_after no longer forces 60s sleeps.** Copilot flagged that `retry_after_header` was always `Some(parse_retry_after(...))`, and `parse_retry_after` returns a 60s default when the header is absent. That meant 502/503/504 responses without a Retry-After header would sleep ~60s between attempts instead of using exponential backoff (1s → 2s → 4s). Now the header is parsed only when present; absent header → `None` → `RetryProvider` falls through to `retry_backoff_delay`. Existing 429 rate-limit behavior is preserved (60s fallback kept explicit at the 429 call site). 2. **HTTP 500 is now mapped to BadGateway.** Gemini (security-medium) pointed out that upstream application errors frequently return 500 with a Python traceback in the body, and my prior change only mapped 502–504. 500 was falling through to `RequestFailed { reason: "HTTP 500: <body>" }` — exactly the leak #2546 describes. Match broadened to `500..=599`; the `status` field still records the specific code for operators. Matches the intent documented in `.claude/rules/error-handling.md` ("raw HTTP 5xx → temporarily unavailable"). 3. **Ephemeral secrets store now fails loud.** Copilot observed that `build_ephemeral_secrets_store` returning `None` + the fallback install silently dropping it left `self.secrets_store = None` possible, which would blow up much later in `init_extensions` with a less-actionable "secrets store not initialized" error. Changed to return `Result`; `install_ephemeral_secrets_store` propagates via `?` so startup aborts at the real root cause. Regression tests: - `llm::retry::tests::bad_gateway_without_retry_after_does_not_match_some_arm` (fix 1 — guards against the `Some(_)` match arm catching a None value) - `llm::retry::tests::test_is_retryable_classification` gains a `BadGateway { status: 500, .. }` case (fix 2) - `app::tests::ephemeral_secrets_store_is_constructible_and_usable` already exercised `.expect(...)` on the builder — now validates the `Result` contract (fix 3) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(engine,gateway): typed orchestrator failure + preserve debug detail Addresses the remaining PR #2753 review feedback (Copilot + serrrfirat): - Introduce OrchestratorFailure / OrchestratorFailureKind typed enum in the engine's error module. Replaces the format!()-built `reason` that fed EngineError::Effect. Parse, start, resume, and NameLookup panic paths all route through the typed classifier — user-safe message via Display, raw detail preserved in `debug_detail`. - EngineError gains an Orchestrator(OrchestratorFailure) variant and a debug_detail() accessor. ThreadOutcome::Failed carries the detail through to the channel edge. - bridge/router.rs: new `gateway_debug_errors_enabled()` helper reads IRONCLAW_DEBUG_ERRORS and appends the preserved detail to the reply when on. Off by default — low-level detail still goes to tracing::debug. - Tighten the orchestrator timeout substring match from the bare "duration" to "timed out" / "timeout" / "duration limit" / "max_duration" / "maximum duration" so unrelated runtime errors no longer get misclassified as time-budget exhaustion. - doctor's check_secrets is now read-only: uses crate::secrets:: resolve_master_key (env + keychain only) instead of the auto- persisting SecretsConfig::resolve. Missing key reports as Skip without mutating ~/.ironclaw/.env. - Chat reload: turn_tool_calls_succeeded keys off the *trailing* tool call rather than every tool call in turn history, so a turn that errored once and recovered via a later successful retry no longer stays pinned to Processing forever. Regression tests: - failure_reason_does_not_treat_bare_duration_as_timeout - failure_reason_strips_python_traceback asserts debug_detail retains raw trace - test_reconcile_allows_recovery_from_earlier_tool_error Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(gateway): surface engine debug detail to Debug Inspector + logs Replaces the IRONCLAW_DEBUG_ERRORS env-var gate with unconditional visibility in the two places it actually belongs: the gateway's Debug Inspector panel and debug text logs. The chat reply stays sanitized. - Drop gateway_debug_errors_enabled() and the env-var-gated append in bridge_outcome_for_failed_thread. The flag was only there because the only delivery path was the chat reply, which can't carry raw detail. - Extend AppEvent::Error with an optional debug_detail field. Serialized onto the SSE `error` event so any listener (Debug Inspector, future tooling) sees it. - On ThreadOutcome::Failed, broadcast AppEvent::Error with {sanitized message, raw debug_detail, thread_id} so the inspector picks it up even though the chat reply is sanitized. - debug-panel.js renders debug_detail underneath the sanitized message on the Activity tab so operators can triage without tailing logs. - tracing::warn! on the failure path now includes debug_detail, which flows through log_layer into the gateway's log event stream. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(engine,gateway,doctor): PR #2753 follow-up review fixes Addresses four Copilot comments on commits3c08e0c3/042c2ee7: - orchestrator.rs: OrchestratorFailureKind::Other no longer renders the raw err_msg in Display. Channel-edge surfaces that bypass `user_facing_thread_failure` (runtime/mission.rs builds `format!("Mission failed: {error}")` directly) would have leaked tracebacks / internal file paths via unclassified Monty errors. User-facing text is now a generic "internal orchestrator failure"; the raw message is preserved on OrchestratorFailure::debug_detail as before. Dropped the now-unused `message` field on Other. - bridge/router.rs: the failure-path `warn!` now logs only `debug_detail_bytes`, not the full detail. Full raw text is emitted at `debug!` level so higher-severity logs don't carry multi-KB tracebacks. Operators still see the complete detail in the Debug Inspector (via AppEvent::Error.debug_detail) or with `RUST_LOG=ironclaw::bridge::router=debug`. - cli/doctor.rs: source_label had an unreachable KeySource::None arm. Since the key-present guard above already returned Skip, `source` is only ever Env or Keychain here — folded the match into the existing env-wins branch. Regression test renamed: `failure_reason_hides_unknown_raw_message_from_user_text` now asserts `Other`'s Display does not leak `NameError` while debug_detail still preserves it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(engine,gateway,doctor): PR #2753 follow-up round 2 Addresses serrrfirat's review on commit82d06410— four issues that remained after the previous fix landed: - router.rs: a failed engine v2 thread on the web flow used to broadcast both AppEvent::Error on SSE and BridgeOutcome::Respond. GatewayChannel::respond then re-broadcast the same sanitized text as a response frame, so the browser rendered the same failure twice. The helper now takes sse_will_deliver_to_user and returns NoResponse when the originating channel is the gateway, so the SSE error card is the single user-visible surface. Non-gateway channels (telegram, relay, cli) still get Respond(sanitized) for primary delivery. - AppEvent::Error: debug_detail travelled on the default scoped SSE error event, where every authenticated consumer (chat UI, devtools, custom clients) sees it. Raw Monty tracebacks / upstream HTTP bodies must not cross that boundary. The field is removed from the wire payload; detail stays server-side via the existing tracing::debug! edge. The Debug Inspector now renders only the sanitized message. - doctor.rs: check_secrets probed the runtime via db::create_secrets_store, which opens a fresh backend and runs migrations — side-effectful, and not the same path that failed on hosted-TEE in #1537. The probe now uses connect_without_migrations + secrets::create_secrets_store(crypto, &handles), exercising the exact DatabaseHandles→Option<Arc<SecretsStore>> dispatch that AppBuilder::init_secrets runs. No migrations fire. - orchestrator.rs: the OrchestratorFailureKind::TimeLimit classifier caught any err_msg containing "timeout"/"timed out", so upstream LLM/network timeouts (Request timed out, Connection timed out) got mapped to TimeLimit and the user-facing message advised raising IRONCLAW_ORCHESTRATOR_MAX_DURATION_SECS — wrong remediation. The predicate set is narrowed to unmistakable Monty wall-clock markers (duration limit / max_duration / maximum duration / execution duration exceeded / orchestrator timed out). Upstream timeouts now fall through to Other. Regression tests: - failed_thread_outcome_is_no_response_when_sse_will_deliver locks in the single-surface contract for the gateway web flow. - failure_reason_does_not_treat_upstream_timeout_as_time_limit asserts four upstream-timeout shapes classify as Other (not TimeLimit) and their user message does NOT advise the budget knob. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(engine,gateway,doctor): PR #2753 follow-up round 3 Addresses Copilot review comments on8489a978plus four review-derived nits surfaced during triage: - Update stale rehydration comment in `reconcile_in_progress_with_turns` to describe trailing-tool-call semantics (earlier failed attempts are allowed if a later retry succeeded) rather than the old "every recorded tool call completed successfully" wording. - Update stale rustdoc on `check_secrets` to describe the read-only `resolve_master_key()` probe instead of the dropped `SecretsConfig:: resolve` path that used to auto-generate keys. - Export `GATEWAY_CHANNEL_NAME` from `channels::web` and reference it from both the `Channel::name()` impl and `bridge::router`, eliminating the duplicated string literal. - Split `parse_retry_after` into two helpers. The existing `Option<&HeaderValue> -> Duration` stays for rate-limit callers (60s default on missing). New `parse_retry_after_value(&HeaderValue) -> Duration` is for 5xx paths that want to distinguish "absent" from "unparseable" so missing headers fall through to exponential backoff. - Strengthen doctor secrets tests: add `check_secrets_reports_env_source_when_env_key_is_set` which, under ENV_MUTEX, sets SECRETS_MASTER_KEY and asserts the rendered message surfaces the env source label plus the settings-vs-runtime drift warning — pinning the exact #1537 hosted-TEE axis the prior "doesn't panic" test couldn't detect. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(doctor): allow await_holding_lock on env-guarded test `check_secrets_reports_env_source_when_env_key_is_set` holds the global `ENV_MUTEX` from `config::helpers::lock_env()` (a `std::sync::Mutex`) across `check_secrets(..).await`, which the `clippy::await_holding_lock` lint flags. The env vars the guard protects (`SECRETS_MASTER_KEY`) must stay pinned through the await because `check_secrets` reads them internally — dropping the guard early would let a concurrent test race on the env var. Mirrors the existing pattern in `bridge::auth_manager` (six existing sites). Local `cargo clippy --lib` missed this; CI runs with `--tests`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
IronClaw
Your secure personal AI assistant, always on your side
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Philosophy • Features • Installation • Configuration • Security • Architecture
Philosophy
IronClaw is built on a simple principle: your AI assistant should work for you, not against you.
In a world where AI systems are increasingly opaque about data handling and aligned with corporate interests, IronClaw takes a different approach:
- Your data stays yours - All information is stored locally, encrypted, and never leaves your control
- Transparency by design - Open source, auditable, no hidden telemetry or data harvesting
- Self-expanding capabilities - Build new tools on the fly without waiting for vendor updates
- Defense in depth - Multiple security layers protect against prompt injection and data exfiltration
IronClaw is the AI assistant you can actually trust with your personal and professional life.
Features
Security First
- WASM Sandbox - Untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers with capability-based permissions
- Credential Protection - Secrets are never exposed to tools; injected at the host boundary with leak detection
- Prompt Injection Defense - Pattern detection, content sanitization, and policy enforcement
- Endpoint Allowlisting - HTTP requests only to explicitly approved hosts and paths
Always Available
- Multi-channel - REPL, HTTP webhooks, WASM channels (Telegram, Slack), and web gateway
- Docker Sandbox - Isolated container execution with per-job tokens and orchestrator/worker pattern
- Web Gateway - Browser UI with real-time SSE/WebSocket streaming
- Routines - Cron schedules, event triggers, webhook handlers for background automation
- Heartbeat System - Proactive background execution for monitoring and maintenance tasks
- Parallel Jobs - Handle multiple requests concurrently with isolated contexts
- Self-repair - Automatic detection and recovery of stuck operations
Self-Expanding
- Dynamic Tool Building - Describe what you need, and IronClaw builds it as a WASM tool
- MCP Protocol - Connect to Model Context Protocol servers for additional capabilities
- Plugin Architecture - Drop in new WASM tools and channels without restarting
Persistent Memory
- Hybrid Search - Full-text + vector search using Reciprocal Rank Fusion
- Workspace Filesystem - Flexible path-based storage for notes, logs, and context
- Identity Files - Maintain consistent personality and preferences across sessions
Installation
Prerequisites
- Rust 1.85+
- PostgreSQL 15+ with pgvector extension
- NEAR AI account (authentication handled via setup wizard)
Download or Build
Visit Releases page to see the latest updates.
Install via Windows Installer (Windows)
Download the Windows Installer and run it.
Install via powershell script (Windows)
irm https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.ps1 | iex
Install via shell script (macOS, Linux, Windows/WSL)
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.sh | sh
Install via Homebrew (macOS/Linux)
brew install ironclaw
Compile the source code (Cargo on Windows, Linux, macOS)
Install it with cargo, just make sure you have Rust installed on your computer.
# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw.git
cd ironclaw
# Build
cargo build --release
# Run tests
cargo test
For full release (after modifying channel sources), run ./scripts/build-all.sh to rebuild channels first.
Database Setup
# Create database
createdb ironclaw
# Enable pgvector
psql ironclaw -c "CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector;"
Configuration
Run the setup wizard to configure IronClaw:
ironclaw onboard
The wizard handles database connection, NEAR AI authentication (via browser OAuth),
and secrets encryption (using your system keychain). Settings are persisted in the
connected database; bootstrap variables (e.g. DATABASE_URL, LLM_BACKEND) are
written to ~/.ironclaw/.env so they are available before the database connects.
Alternative LLM Providers
IronClaw defaults to NEAR AI but supports many LLM providers out of the box. Built-in providers include Anthropic, OpenAI, GitHub Copilot, Google Gemini, MiniMax, Mistral, and Ollama (local). OpenAI-compatible services like OpenRouter (300+ models), Together AI, Fireworks AI, and self-hosted servers (vLLM, LiteLLM) are also supported.
Select your provider in the wizard, or set environment variables directly:
# Example: MiniMax (built-in, 204K context)
LLM_BACKEND=minimax
MINIMAX_API_KEY=...
# Example: OpenAI-compatible endpoint
LLM_BACKEND=openai_compatible
LLM_BASE_URL=https://openrouter.ai/api/v1
LLM_API_KEY=sk-or-...
LLM_MODEL=anthropic/claude-sonnet-4
See docs/capabilities/llm-providers.md for a full provider guide.
Security
IronClaw implements defense in depth to protect your data and prevent misuse.
WASM Sandbox
All untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers:
- Capability-based permissions - Explicit opt-in for HTTP, secrets, tool invocation
- Endpoint allowlisting - HTTP requests only to approved hosts/paths
- Credential injection - Secrets injected at host boundary, never exposed to WASM code
- Leak detection - Scans requests and responses for secret exfiltration attempts
- Rate limiting - Per-tool request limits to prevent abuse
- Resource limits - Memory, CPU, and execution time constraints
WASM ──► Allowlist ──► Leak Scan ──► Credential ──► Execute ──► Leak Scan ──► WASM
Validator (request) Injector Request (response)
Prompt Injection Defense
External content passes through multiple security layers:
- Pattern-based detection of injection attempts
- Content sanitization and escaping
- Policy rules with severity levels (Block/Warn/Review/Sanitize)
- Tool output wrapping for safe LLM context injection
Data Protection
- All data stored locally in your PostgreSQL database
- Secrets encrypted with AES-256-GCM
- No telemetry, analytics, or data sharing
- Full audit log of all tool executions
Architecture
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Channels │
│ ┌──────┐ ┌──────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ │
│ │ REPL │ │ HTTP │ │WASM Channels│ │ Web Gateway │ │
│ └──┬───┘ └──┬───┘ └──────┬──────┘ │ (SSE + WS) │ │
│ │ │ │ └──────┬──────┘ │
│ └─────────┴──────────────┴────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌─────────▼─────────┐ │
│ │ Agent Loop │ Intent routing │
│ └────┬──────────┬───┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌──────────▼────┐ ┌──▼───────────────┐ │
│ │ Scheduler │ │ Routines Engine │ │
│ │(parallel jobs)│ │(cron, event, wh) │ │
│ └──────┬────────┘ └────────┬─────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌─────────────┼────────────────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌───▼─────┐ ┌────▼────────────────┐ │
│ │ Local │ │ Orchestrator │ │
│ │Workers │ │ ┌───────────────┐ │ │
│ │(in-proc)│ │ │ Docker Sandbox│ │ │
│ └───┬─────┘ │ │ Containers │ │ │
│ │ │ │ ┌───────────┐ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ │Worker / CC│ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ └───────────┘ │ │ │
│ │ │ └───────────────┘ │ │
│ │ └─────────┬───────────┘ │
│ └──────────────────┤ │
│ │ │
│ ┌───────────▼──────────┐ │
│ │ Tool Registry │ │
│ │ Built-in, MCP, WASM │ │
│ └──────────────────────┘ │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Core Components
| Component | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Agent Loop | Main message handling and job coordination |
| Router | Classifies user intent (command, query, task) |
| Scheduler | Manages parallel job execution with priorities |
| Worker | Executes jobs with LLM reasoning and tool calls |
| Orchestrator | Container lifecycle, LLM proxying, per-job auth |
| Web Gateway | Browser UI with chat, memory, jobs, logs, extensions, routines |
| Routines Engine | Scheduled (cron) and reactive (event, webhook) background tasks |
| Workspace | Persistent memory with hybrid search |
| Safety Layer | Prompt injection defense and content sanitization |
Usage
Engine v2 is opt-in right now. If you want to run the new engine instead of the legacy agent loop, start IronClaw with ENGINE_V2=true. See Engine v2 architecture for more details.
# First-time setup (configures database, auth, etc.)
ironclaw onboard
# Start interactive REPL
cargo run
# Start interactive REPL with engine v2
ENGINE_V2=true cargo run
# Engine v2 with debug logging
ENGINE_V2=true RUST_LOG=ironclaw=debug cargo run
Development
# Format code
cargo fmt
# Lint
cargo clippy --all --benches --tests --examples --all-features
# Run tests
createdb ironclaw_test
cargo test
# Run specific test
cargo test test_name
- Channels: See docs/channels/overview.mdx for setup of Telegram, Discord, and other channels.
- Changing channel sources: Run
./channels-src/telegram/build.shbeforecargo buildso the updated WASM is bundled.
OpenClaw Heritage
IronClaw is a Rust reimplementation inspired by OpenClaw. See FEATURE_PARITY.md for the complete tracking matrix.
Key differences:
- Rust vs TypeScript - Native performance, memory safety, single binary
- WASM sandbox vs Docker - Lightweight, capability-based security
- PostgreSQL vs SQLite - Production-ready persistence
- Security-first design - Multiple defense layers, credential protection
License
Licensed under either of:
- Apache License, Version 2.0 (LICENSE-APACHE)
- MIT License (LICENSE-MIT)
at your option.
