* feat(credentials): path-based credential matching for per-endpoint auth Add `path_patterns` field to `CredentialMapping` to scope credentials to specific URL path prefixes on a host. When set, the request path must match a prefix at a segment boundary (`/` or `?`). When empty (default), credentials match all paths on the host — fully backwards compatible. Key changes: - `CredentialMapping.matches(host, path)` with segment-boundary enforcement - `path_matches_prefix()` rejects `..` traversal, normalizes trailing slashes - `host_matches_pattern()` deduplicated to single source in secrets/types.rs, case-insensitive per RFC 4343 - HTTP tool uses `find_for_url(host, path)` for path-aware credential lookup - Auth manager pre-flight check uses path-aware `find_for_url` - WASM tool/channel wrappers carry `path_patterns` through to injection time - `CredentialMappingSchema`, `SkillCredentialSpec` support `path_patterns` Tests cover segment-boundary attacks, path traversal rejection, case-insensitive host matching, path-scoped injection, and different credentials for different paths on the same host. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(credentials): address PR #2168 review feedback - Narrow `..` rejection in path_matches_prefix to per-segment so legitimate paths like /api/..config are no longer falsely blocked (path_matches_prefix was using path.contains("..")). - Path-scope credential injection in the channels WASM wrapper: ResolvedHostCredential now carries path_patterns and inject_host_credentials honors it, matching the tools-side wrapper. - Add path-aware CredentialInjector API (find_credentials_for_url / inject_for_url); deprecate the host-only variants and SharedCredentialRegistry::find_for_host with #[deprecated] attrs. - Tighten CredentialMappingSchema.path_patterns from Option<Vec<String>> to #[serde(default)] Vec<String>, matching sibling types. - Validate path_patterns in validate_credential_spec: require leading '/', reject empty, reject '..' as a segment. - Expand comment in http.rs documenting why LLM-header blocking is host-scoped (exfil defense) while injection is path-scoped (minimum privilege). Tests: +5 validation cases, +2 injector cases, +2 channel wrapper cases, +2 path_matches_prefix cases covering dot-dot-inside-segment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(credentials): address PR #2168 round-3 review - secrets/types: reject %2e / %2E in paths (percent-encoded traversal bypass for servers that decode before routing, e.g. IIS/Tomcat) - sandbox/proxy/policy: find_credential now honors path_patterns via CredentialMapping::matches, using request.path (regression test added) - wasm wrappers: extract shared extract_url_path_for_matching helper in secrets/types, with tracing::debug! on URL parse failure; removes duplicated 12-line block between tools/wasm and channels/wasm - ironclaw_skills/validation: factor validate_path_pattern out of validate_credential_spec and reject '?' and '#' in path_patterns (Url::path() strips them, so these silently never match) - tools/wasm/capabilities_schema: plumb the same validate_path_pattern through the WASM manifest loader — bad patterns log as warnings instead of silently failing to match - tools/builtin/http: unit tests for extract_path_from_params (valid, missing url, query+fragment stripping, bare host, malformed) - tests/skill_credential_injection: caller-level tests driving HttpTool::execute with path-scoped credentials — segment boundary and auth-gap-on-non-matching-path (per .claude/rules/testing.md "Test Through the Caller, Not Just the Helper") Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(credentials): address PR #2168 round-4 review - secrets/types: path_matches_prefix now decodes each segment and rejects only dot-segments (literal . or .., plus percent-encoded equivalents like %2e, %2e%2e, mixed case, .%2e, %2e.). Legitimate literal paths with embedded encoded dots — /files/foo%2ebar → foo.bar, /releases/v1%2e2 → v1.2 — are now allowed. Replaces the previous "reject any %2e substring" rule which over-rejected normal filenames. (Firat #3125964627) - secrets/types: add match_specificity(path_patterns, req_path) returning the length of the longest matching prefix (0 if unscoped). Exported pub(crate) for callers that need deterministic credential precedence. - credential_injector + both wasm wrappers: sort matching credentials by ascending path specificity, tie-broken alphabetically on secret_name, before the last-write-wins header merge. The most-specific mapping now wins any header conflict regardless of HashMap iteration order, which fixes nondeterministic winner selection on overlapping mappings. ResolvedHostCredential gains a secret_name field purely for stable tie-breaks (no secret material exposed). (Firat #3125963270) - bridge/auth_manager::check_http_auth: replace "return Ready on first resolved mapping" short-circuit with conjunctive evaluation — every non-optional matched mapping must resolve for Ready. Optional mappings are skipped. Missing required credentials are accumulated and returned as MissingCredentials so endpoints needing bearer + org-header surface the auth gate instead of failing at the wire with a raw 401. (Firat #3125963977) - tools/builtin/http::execute: stop clearing missing_credential on peer success and drop the !injected_any_credential guard. Track the first missing required credential for the 401/403 remediation UX; skip optional mappings. Matches the new auth_manager behavior. Regression tests: - secrets/types: path_matches_prefix_rejects_percent_encoded_dot_segments (adds .%2e and %2e. mixed-form cases), path_matches_prefix_allows_legit_ embedded_encoded_dot (foo%2ebar, v1%2e2), match_specificity_ranks_ longer_prefixes_higher. - tools/wasm/wrapper: test_inject_host_credentials_most_specific_path_wins verifies the sort is order-independent by constructing the same creds in both orders and asserting the specific one wins. - bridge/auth_manager: check_http_conjunctive_auth_any_missing_required_ raises_gate, check_http_conjunctive_auth_all_required_resolved_is_ready. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: cargo fmt after round-3/round-4 review fixes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: untrack accidentally-committed local scratch files Follow-up to50f6771f, which inadvertently staged local-only scratch files via `git add -A`: - .DS_Store - tests_all/ — operator scratch dir with env files (rotate any tokens that were in tests_all/source_env_vars.sh in that commit) - integrations/abound/tests/source_env_vars.sh — same concern - src/cli/snapshots/*.snap.new — stale insta snapshot proposals that should be resolved via `cargo insta review`, not committed This commit removes them from the index and adds matching patterns to .gitignore so they cannot recur. The content is left on disk for local use. NOTE: the tokens that were in the env files are still visible in the50f6771fcommit object and must be rotated regardless of this cleanup. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(credentials): address PR #2168 round-5 review - secrets/types: tighten the percent-decoded dot-segment check to also reject segments whose decoded form contains `/` (percent-encoded slash, e.g. `%2f`). Blocks `%2e%2e%2fadmin`-style smuggling on servers that decode encoded slashes before routing (Tomcat with `allowEncodedSlash=true`, older IIS, certain reverse proxies). Literal dots inside a single segment (`foo%2ebar`, `v1%2e2`) stay allowed. (Firat #3126256056) - sandbox/proxy/policy: `find_credential` now returns the most-specific matching mapping via `max_by(...)` on `(match_specificity, secret_name)` rather than `.find(...)`. Behavior matches `SharedCredentialRegistry:: find_for_url` and both WASM `inject_host_credentials` — a host with a global + a `/api/v1/write` credential picks WRITE_TOKEN on writes regardless of Vec order. (Firat #3126256060) - tools/wasm/capabilities_schema: `to_credential_mapping` now returns `Option` and `to_http_capability` filter_maps invalid mappings out entirely. Previously `path_patterns: [""]` survived the warning-only validator and silently widened the credential back to global scope (`path_matches_prefix(path, "")` → true for every absolute path). The drop-on-invalid semantics match the skills pipeline. Removed the duplicate warn-loop in `validate()` since the load path now handles it. (Firat #3126256040) Regression tests: - secrets/types: path_matches_prefix_rejects_percent_encoded_slash_ smuggling covers lowercase/uppercase `%2f` in traversal and embedded positions. - sandbox/proxy/policy: test_sandbox_proxy_most_specific_credential_ wins registers the same credentials in both orders and asserts WRITE_TOKEN always wins on the write path. - tools/wasm/capabilities_schema: three tests covering empty-string pattern (drops mapping), missing-leading-slash (drops mapping), and valid pattern (preserved). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
IronClaw
Your secure personal AI assistant, always on your side
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Philosophy • Features • Installation • Configuration • Security • Architecture
Philosophy
IronClaw is built on a simple principle: your AI assistant should work for you, not against you.
In a world where AI systems are increasingly opaque about data handling and aligned with corporate interests, IronClaw takes a different approach:
- Your data stays yours - All information is stored locally, encrypted, and never leaves your control
- Transparency by design - Open source, auditable, no hidden telemetry or data harvesting
- Self-expanding capabilities - Build new tools on the fly without waiting for vendor updates
- Defense in depth - Multiple security layers protect against prompt injection and data exfiltration
IronClaw is the AI assistant you can actually trust with your personal and professional life.
Features
Security First
- WASM Sandbox - Untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers with capability-based permissions
- Credential Protection - Secrets are never exposed to tools; injected at the host boundary with leak detection
- Prompt Injection Defense - Pattern detection, content sanitization, and policy enforcement
- Endpoint Allowlisting - HTTP requests only to explicitly approved hosts and paths
Always Available
- Multi-channel - REPL, HTTP webhooks, WASM channels (Telegram, Slack), and web gateway
- Docker Sandbox - Isolated container execution with per-job tokens and orchestrator/worker pattern
- Web Gateway - Browser UI with real-time SSE/WebSocket streaming
- Routines - Cron schedules, event triggers, webhook handlers for background automation
- Heartbeat System - Proactive background execution for monitoring and maintenance tasks
- Parallel Jobs - Handle multiple requests concurrently with isolated contexts
- Self-repair - Automatic detection and recovery of stuck operations
Self-Expanding
- Dynamic Tool Building - Describe what you need, and IronClaw builds it as a WASM tool
- MCP Protocol - Connect to Model Context Protocol servers for additional capabilities
- Plugin Architecture - Drop in new WASM tools and channels without restarting
Persistent Memory
- Hybrid Search - Full-text + vector search using Reciprocal Rank Fusion
- Workspace Filesystem - Flexible path-based storage for notes, logs, and context
- Identity Files - Maintain consistent personality and preferences across sessions
Installation
Prerequisites
- Rust 1.85+
- PostgreSQL 15+ with pgvector extension
- NEAR AI account (authentication handled via setup wizard)
Download or Build
Visit Releases page to see the latest updates.
Install via Windows Installer (Windows)
Download the Windows Installer and run it.
Install via powershell script (Windows)
irm https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.ps1 | iex
Install via shell script (macOS, Linux, Windows/WSL)
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.sh | sh
Install via Homebrew (macOS/Linux)
brew install ironclaw
Compile the source code (Cargo on Windows, Linux, macOS)
Install it with cargo, just make sure you have Rust installed on your computer.
# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw.git
cd ironclaw
# Build
cargo build --release
# Run tests
cargo test
For full release (after modifying channel sources), run ./scripts/build-all.sh to rebuild channels first.
Database Setup
# Create database
createdb ironclaw
# Enable pgvector
psql ironclaw -c "CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector;"
Configuration
Run the setup wizard to configure IronClaw:
ironclaw onboard
The wizard handles database connection, NEAR AI authentication (via browser OAuth),
and secrets encryption (using your system keychain). Settings are persisted in the
connected database; bootstrap variables (e.g. DATABASE_URL, LLM_BACKEND) are
written to ~/.ironclaw/.env so they are available before the database connects.
Alternative LLM Providers
IronClaw defaults to NEAR AI but supports many LLM providers out of the box. Built-in providers include Anthropic, OpenAI, GitHub Copilot, Google Gemini, MiniMax, Mistral, and Ollama (local). OpenAI-compatible services like OpenRouter (300+ models), Together AI, Fireworks AI, and self-hosted servers (vLLM, LiteLLM) are also supported.
Select your provider in the wizard, or set environment variables directly:
# Example: MiniMax (built-in, 204K context)
LLM_BACKEND=minimax
MINIMAX_API_KEY=...
# Example: OpenAI-compatible endpoint
LLM_BACKEND=openai_compatible
LLM_BASE_URL=https://openrouter.ai/api/v1
LLM_API_KEY=sk-or-...
LLM_MODEL=anthropic/claude-sonnet-4
See docs/capabilities/llm-providers.md for a full provider guide.
Security
IronClaw implements defense in depth to protect your data and prevent misuse.
WASM Sandbox
All untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers:
- Capability-based permissions - Explicit opt-in for HTTP, secrets, tool invocation
- Endpoint allowlisting - HTTP requests only to approved hosts/paths
- Credential injection - Secrets injected at host boundary, never exposed to WASM code
- Leak detection - Scans requests and responses for secret exfiltration attempts
- Rate limiting - Per-tool request limits to prevent abuse
- Resource limits - Memory, CPU, and execution time constraints
WASM ──► Allowlist ──► Leak Scan ──► Credential ──► Execute ──► Leak Scan ──► WASM
Validator (request) Injector Request (response)
Prompt Injection Defense
External content passes through multiple security layers:
- Pattern-based detection of injection attempts
- Content sanitization and escaping
- Policy rules with severity levels (Block/Warn/Review/Sanitize)
- Tool output wrapping for safe LLM context injection
Data Protection
- All data stored locally in your PostgreSQL database
- Secrets encrypted with AES-256-GCM
- No telemetry, analytics, or data sharing
- Full audit log of all tool executions
Architecture
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Channels │
│ ┌──────┐ ┌──────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ │
│ │ REPL │ │ HTTP │ │WASM Channels│ │ Web Gateway │ │
│ └──┬───┘ └──┬───┘ └──────┬──────┘ │ (SSE + WS) │ │
│ │ │ │ └──────┬──────┘ │
│ └─────────┴──────────────┴────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌─────────▼─────────┐ │
│ │ Agent Loop │ Intent routing │
│ └────┬──────────┬───┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌──────────▼────┐ ┌──▼───────────────┐ │
│ │ Scheduler │ │ Routines Engine │ │
│ │(parallel jobs)│ │(cron, event, wh) │ │
│ └──────┬────────┘ └────────┬─────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌─────────────┼────────────────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌───▼─────┐ ┌────▼────────────────┐ │
│ │ Local │ │ Orchestrator │ │
│ │Workers │ │ ┌───────────────┐ │ │
│ │(in-proc)│ │ │ Docker Sandbox│ │ │
│ └───┬─────┘ │ │ Containers │ │ │
│ │ │ │ ┌───────────┐ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ │Worker / CC│ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ └───────────┘ │ │ │
│ │ │ └───────────────┘ │ │
│ │ └─────────┬───────────┘ │
│ └──────────────────┤ │
│ │ │
│ ┌───────────▼──────────┐ │
│ │ Tool Registry │ │
│ │ Built-in, MCP, WASM │ │
│ └──────────────────────┘ │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Core Components
| Component | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Agent Loop | Main message handling and job coordination |
| Router | Classifies user intent (command, query, task) |
| Scheduler | Manages parallel job execution with priorities |
| Worker | Executes jobs with LLM reasoning and tool calls |
| Orchestrator | Container lifecycle, LLM proxying, per-job auth |
| Web Gateway | Browser UI with chat, memory, jobs, logs, extensions, routines |
| Routines Engine | Scheduled (cron) and reactive (event, webhook) background tasks |
| Workspace | Persistent memory with hybrid search |
| Safety Layer | Prompt injection defense and content sanitization |
Usage
Engine v2 is opt-in right now. If you want to run the new engine instead of the legacy agent loop, start IronClaw with ENGINE_V2=true. See Engine v2 architecture for more details.
# First-time setup (configures database, auth, etc.)
ironclaw onboard
# Start interactive REPL
cargo run
# Start interactive REPL with engine v2
ENGINE_V2=true cargo run
# Engine v2 with debug logging
ENGINE_V2=true RUST_LOG=ironclaw=debug cargo run
Development
# Format code
cargo fmt
# Lint
cargo clippy --all --benches --tests --examples --all-features
# Run tests
createdb ironclaw_test
cargo test
# Run specific test
cargo test test_name
- Channels: See docs/channels/overview.mdx for setup of Telegram, Discord, and other channels.
- Changing channel sources: Run
./channels-src/telegram/build.shbeforecargo buildso the updated WASM is bundled.
OpenClaw Heritage
IronClaw is a Rust reimplementation inspired by OpenClaw. See FEATURE_PARITY.md for the complete tracking matrix.
Key differences:
- Rust vs TypeScript - Native performance, memory safety, single binary
- WASM sandbox vs Docker - Lightweight, capability-based security
- PostgreSQL vs SQLite - Production-ready persistence
- Security-first design - Multiple defense layers, credential protection
License
Licensed under either of:
- Apache License, Version 2.0 (LICENSE-APACHE)
- MIT License (LICENSE-MIT)
at your option.
