Pranav Raja 49f3e8d566 feat(credentials): path-based credential matching for per-endpoint auth (#2168)
* feat(credentials): path-based credential matching for per-endpoint auth

Add `path_patterns` field to `CredentialMapping` to scope credentials to
specific URL path prefixes on a host. When set, the request path must
match a prefix at a segment boundary (`/` or `?`). When empty (default),
credentials match all paths on the host — fully backwards compatible.

Key changes:
- `CredentialMapping.matches(host, path)` with segment-boundary enforcement
- `path_matches_prefix()` rejects `..` traversal, normalizes trailing slashes
- `host_matches_pattern()` deduplicated to single source in secrets/types.rs,
  case-insensitive per RFC 4343
- HTTP tool uses `find_for_url(host, path)` for path-aware credential lookup
- Auth manager pre-flight check uses path-aware `find_for_url`
- WASM tool/channel wrappers carry `path_patterns` through to injection time
- `CredentialMappingSchema`, `SkillCredentialSpec` support `path_patterns`

Tests cover segment-boundary attacks, path traversal rejection, case-insensitive
host matching, path-scoped injection, and different credentials for different
paths on the same host.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(credentials): address PR #2168 review feedback

- Narrow `..` rejection in path_matches_prefix to per-segment so
  legitimate paths like /api/..config are no longer falsely blocked
  (path_matches_prefix was using path.contains("..")).
- Path-scope credential injection in the channels WASM wrapper:
  ResolvedHostCredential now carries path_patterns and
  inject_host_credentials honors it, matching the tools-side wrapper.
- Add path-aware CredentialInjector API (find_credentials_for_url /
  inject_for_url); deprecate the host-only variants and
  SharedCredentialRegistry::find_for_host with #[deprecated] attrs.
- Tighten CredentialMappingSchema.path_patterns from
  Option<Vec<String>> to #[serde(default)] Vec<String>, matching
  sibling types.
- Validate path_patterns in validate_credential_spec: require
  leading '/', reject empty, reject '..' as a segment.
- Expand comment in http.rs documenting why LLM-header blocking is
  host-scoped (exfil defense) while injection is path-scoped
  (minimum privilege).

Tests: +5 validation cases, +2 injector cases, +2 channel wrapper
cases, +2 path_matches_prefix cases covering dot-dot-inside-segment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(credentials): address PR #2168 round-3 review

- secrets/types: reject %2e / %2E in paths (percent-encoded traversal
  bypass for servers that decode before routing, e.g. IIS/Tomcat)
- sandbox/proxy/policy: find_credential now honors path_patterns via
  CredentialMapping::matches, using request.path (regression test added)
- wasm wrappers: extract shared extract_url_path_for_matching helper in
  secrets/types, with tracing::debug! on URL parse failure; removes
  duplicated 12-line block between tools/wasm and channels/wasm
- ironclaw_skills/validation: factor validate_path_pattern out of
  validate_credential_spec and reject '?' and '#' in path_patterns
  (Url::path() strips them, so these silently never match)
- tools/wasm/capabilities_schema: plumb the same validate_path_pattern
  through the WASM manifest loader — bad patterns log as warnings
  instead of silently failing to match
- tools/builtin/http: unit tests for extract_path_from_params (valid,
  missing url, query+fragment stripping, bare host, malformed)
- tests/skill_credential_injection: caller-level tests driving
  HttpTool::execute with path-scoped credentials — segment boundary
  and auth-gap-on-non-matching-path (per .claude/rules/testing.md
  "Test Through the Caller, Not Just the Helper")

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(credentials): address PR #2168 round-4 review

- secrets/types: path_matches_prefix now decodes each segment and rejects
  only dot-segments (literal . or .., plus percent-encoded equivalents
  like %2e, %2e%2e, mixed case, .%2e, %2e.). Legitimate literal paths
  with embedded encoded dots — /files/foo%2ebar → foo.bar,
  /releases/v1%2e2 → v1.2 — are now allowed. Replaces the previous
  "reject any %2e substring" rule which over-rejected normal filenames.
  (Firat #3125964627)

- secrets/types: add match_specificity(path_patterns, req_path) returning
  the length of the longest matching prefix (0 if unscoped). Exported
  pub(crate) for callers that need deterministic credential precedence.

- credential_injector + both wasm wrappers: sort matching credentials by
  ascending path specificity, tie-broken alphabetically on secret_name,
  before the last-write-wins header merge. The most-specific mapping now
  wins any header conflict regardless of HashMap iteration order, which
  fixes nondeterministic winner selection on overlapping mappings.
  ResolvedHostCredential gains a secret_name field purely for stable
  tie-breaks (no secret material exposed). (Firat #3125963270)

- bridge/auth_manager::check_http_auth: replace "return Ready on first
  resolved mapping" short-circuit with conjunctive evaluation — every
  non-optional matched mapping must resolve for Ready. Optional mappings
  are skipped. Missing required credentials are accumulated and returned
  as MissingCredentials so endpoints needing bearer + org-header surface
  the auth gate instead of failing at the wire with a raw 401.
  (Firat #3125963977)

- tools/builtin/http::execute: stop clearing missing_credential on peer
  success and drop the !injected_any_credential guard. Track the first
  missing required credential for the 401/403 remediation UX; skip
  optional mappings. Matches the new auth_manager behavior.

Regression tests:
- secrets/types: path_matches_prefix_rejects_percent_encoded_dot_segments
  (adds .%2e and %2e. mixed-form cases), path_matches_prefix_allows_legit_
  embedded_encoded_dot (foo%2ebar, v1%2e2), match_specificity_ranks_
  longer_prefixes_higher.
- tools/wasm/wrapper: test_inject_host_credentials_most_specific_path_wins
  verifies the sort is order-independent by constructing the same creds
  in both orders and asserting the specific one wins.
- bridge/auth_manager: check_http_conjunctive_auth_any_missing_required_
  raises_gate, check_http_conjunctive_auth_all_required_resolved_is_ready.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* style: cargo fmt after round-3/round-4 review fixes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: untrack accidentally-committed local scratch files

Follow-up to 50f6771f, which inadvertently staged local-only scratch
files via `git add -A`:
- .DS_Store
- tests_all/ — operator scratch dir with env files (rotate any tokens
  that were in tests_all/source_env_vars.sh in that commit)
- integrations/abound/tests/source_env_vars.sh — same concern
- src/cli/snapshots/*.snap.new — stale insta snapshot proposals that
  should be resolved via `cargo insta review`, not committed

This commit removes them from the index and adds matching patterns to
.gitignore so they cannot recur. The content is left on disk for local
use.

NOTE: the tokens that were in the env files are still visible in the
50f6771f commit object and must be rotated regardless of this cleanup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(credentials): address PR #2168 round-5 review

- secrets/types: tighten the percent-decoded dot-segment check to also
  reject segments whose decoded form contains `/` (percent-encoded
  slash, e.g. `%2f`). Blocks `%2e%2e%2fadmin`-style smuggling on
  servers that decode encoded slashes before routing (Tomcat with
  `allowEncodedSlash=true`, older IIS, certain reverse proxies).
  Literal dots inside a single segment (`foo%2ebar`, `v1%2e2`) stay
  allowed. (Firat #3126256056)
- sandbox/proxy/policy: `find_credential` now returns the most-specific
  matching mapping via `max_by(...)` on `(match_specificity, secret_name)`
  rather than `.find(...)`. Behavior matches `SharedCredentialRegistry::
  find_for_url` and both WASM `inject_host_credentials` — a host with a
  global + a `/api/v1/write` credential picks WRITE_TOKEN on writes
  regardless of Vec order. (Firat #3126256060)
- tools/wasm/capabilities_schema: `to_credential_mapping` now returns
  `Option` and `to_http_capability` filter_maps invalid mappings out
  entirely. Previously `path_patterns: [""]` survived the warning-only
  validator and silently widened the credential back to global scope
  (`path_matches_prefix(path, "")` → true for every absolute path).
  The drop-on-invalid semantics match the skills pipeline. Removed the
  duplicate warn-loop in `validate()` since the load path now handles
  it. (Firat #3126256040)

Regression tests:
- secrets/types: path_matches_prefix_rejects_percent_encoded_slash_
  smuggling covers lowercase/uppercase `%2f` in traversal and embedded
  positions.
- sandbox/proxy/policy: test_sandbox_proxy_most_specific_credential_
  wins registers the same credentials in both orders and asserts
  WRITE_TOKEN always wins on the write path.
- tools/wasm/capabilities_schema: three tests covering empty-string
  pattern (drops mapping), missing-leading-slash (drops mapping), and
  valid pattern (preserved).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-23 11:58:26 -07:00
2026-02-22 19:08:43 +00:00
2026-02-22 19:08:43 +00:00
2026-02-21 15:14:57 -07:00

IronClaw

IronClaw

Your secure personal AI assistant, always on your side

License: MIT OR Apache-2.0 Telegram: @ironclawAI Reddit: r/ironclawAI gitcgr

English | 简体中文 | Русский | 日本語 | 한국어

PhilosophyFeaturesInstallationConfigurationSecurityArchitecture


Philosophy

IronClaw is built on a simple principle: your AI assistant should work for you, not against you.

In a world where AI systems are increasingly opaque about data handling and aligned with corporate interests, IronClaw takes a different approach:

  • Your data stays yours - All information is stored locally, encrypted, and never leaves your control
  • Transparency by design - Open source, auditable, no hidden telemetry or data harvesting
  • Self-expanding capabilities - Build new tools on the fly without waiting for vendor updates
  • Defense in depth - Multiple security layers protect against prompt injection and data exfiltration

IronClaw is the AI assistant you can actually trust with your personal and professional life.

Features

Security First

  • WASM Sandbox - Untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers with capability-based permissions
  • Credential Protection - Secrets are never exposed to tools; injected at the host boundary with leak detection
  • Prompt Injection Defense - Pattern detection, content sanitization, and policy enforcement
  • Endpoint Allowlisting - HTTP requests only to explicitly approved hosts and paths

Always Available

  • Multi-channel - REPL, HTTP webhooks, WASM channels (Telegram, Slack), and web gateway
  • Docker Sandbox - Isolated container execution with per-job tokens and orchestrator/worker pattern
  • Web Gateway - Browser UI with real-time SSE/WebSocket streaming
  • Routines - Cron schedules, event triggers, webhook handlers for background automation
  • Heartbeat System - Proactive background execution for monitoring and maintenance tasks
  • Parallel Jobs - Handle multiple requests concurrently with isolated contexts
  • Self-repair - Automatic detection and recovery of stuck operations

Self-Expanding

  • Dynamic Tool Building - Describe what you need, and IronClaw builds it as a WASM tool
  • MCP Protocol - Connect to Model Context Protocol servers for additional capabilities
  • Plugin Architecture - Drop in new WASM tools and channels without restarting

Persistent Memory

  • Hybrid Search - Full-text + vector search using Reciprocal Rank Fusion
  • Workspace Filesystem - Flexible path-based storage for notes, logs, and context
  • Identity Files - Maintain consistent personality and preferences across sessions

Installation

Prerequisites

  • Rust 1.85+
  • PostgreSQL 15+ with pgvector extension
  • NEAR AI account (authentication handled via setup wizard)

Download or Build

Visit Releases page to see the latest updates.

Install via Windows Installer (Windows)

Download the Windows Installer and run it.

Install via powershell script (Windows)
irm https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.ps1 | iex
Install via shell script (macOS, Linux, Windows/WSL)
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.sh | sh
Install via Homebrew (macOS/Linux)
brew install ironclaw
Compile the source code (Cargo on Windows, Linux, macOS)

Install it with cargo, just make sure you have Rust installed on your computer.

# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw.git
cd ironclaw

# Build
cargo build --release

# Run tests
cargo test

For full release (after modifying channel sources), run ./scripts/build-all.sh to rebuild channels first.

Database Setup

# Create database
createdb ironclaw

# Enable pgvector
psql ironclaw -c "CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector;"

Configuration

Run the setup wizard to configure IronClaw:

ironclaw onboard

The wizard handles database connection, NEAR AI authentication (via browser OAuth), and secrets encryption (using your system keychain). Settings are persisted in the connected database; bootstrap variables (e.g. DATABASE_URL, LLM_BACKEND) are written to ~/.ironclaw/.env so they are available before the database connects.

Alternative LLM Providers

IronClaw defaults to NEAR AI but supports many LLM providers out of the box. Built-in providers include Anthropic, OpenAI, GitHub Copilot, Google Gemini, MiniMax, Mistral, and Ollama (local). OpenAI-compatible services like OpenRouter (300+ models), Together AI, Fireworks AI, and self-hosted servers (vLLM, LiteLLM) are also supported.

Select your provider in the wizard, or set environment variables directly:

# Example: MiniMax (built-in, 204K context)
LLM_BACKEND=minimax
MINIMAX_API_KEY=...

# Example: OpenAI-compatible endpoint
LLM_BACKEND=openai_compatible
LLM_BASE_URL=https://openrouter.ai/api/v1
LLM_API_KEY=sk-or-...
LLM_MODEL=anthropic/claude-sonnet-4

See docs/capabilities/llm-providers.md for a full provider guide.

Security

IronClaw implements defense in depth to protect your data and prevent misuse.

WASM Sandbox

All untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers:

  • Capability-based permissions - Explicit opt-in for HTTP, secrets, tool invocation
  • Endpoint allowlisting - HTTP requests only to approved hosts/paths
  • Credential injection - Secrets injected at host boundary, never exposed to WASM code
  • Leak detection - Scans requests and responses for secret exfiltration attempts
  • Rate limiting - Per-tool request limits to prevent abuse
  • Resource limits - Memory, CPU, and execution time constraints
WASM ──► Allowlist ──► Leak Scan ──► Credential ──► Execute ──► Leak Scan ──► WASM
         Validator     (request)     Injector       Request     (response)

Prompt Injection Defense

External content passes through multiple security layers:

  • Pattern-based detection of injection attempts
  • Content sanitization and escaping
  • Policy rules with severity levels (Block/Warn/Review/Sanitize)
  • Tool output wrapping for safe LLM context injection

Data Protection

  • All data stored locally in your PostgreSQL database
  • Secrets encrypted with AES-256-GCM
  • No telemetry, analytics, or data sharing
  • Full audit log of all tool executions

Architecture

┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                          Channels                              │
│  ┌──────┐  ┌──────┐   ┌─────────────┐  ┌─────────────┐         │
│  │ REPL │  │ HTTP │   │WASM Channels│  │ Web Gateway │         │
│  └──┬───┘  └──┬───┘   └──────┬──────┘  │ (SSE + WS)  │         │
│     │         │              │         └──────┬──────┘         │
│     └─────────┴──────────────┴────────────────┘                │
│                              │                                 │
│                    ┌─────────▼─────────┐                       │
│                    │    Agent Loop     │  Intent routing       │
│                    └────┬──────────┬───┘                       │
│                         │          │                           │
│              ┌──────────▼────┐  ┌──▼───────────────┐           │
│              │  Scheduler    │  │ Routines Engine  │           │
│              │(parallel jobs)│  │(cron, event, wh) │           │
│              └──────┬────────┘  └────────┬─────────┘           │
│                     │                    │                     │
│       ┌─────────────┼────────────────────┘                     │
│       │             │                                          │
│   ┌───▼─────┐  ┌────▼────────────────┐                         │
│   │ Local   │  │    Orchestrator     │                         │
│   │Workers  │  │  ┌───────────────┐  │                         │
│   │(in-proc)│  │  │ Docker Sandbox│  │                         │
│   └───┬─────┘  │  │   Containers  │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ ┌───────────┐ │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ │Worker / CC│ │  │                         │
│       │        │  │ └───────────┘ │  │                         │
│       │        │  └───────────────┘  │                         │
│       │        └─────────┬───────────┘                         │
│       └──────────────────┤                                     │
│                          │                                     │
│              ┌───────────▼──────────┐                          │
│              │    Tool Registry     │                          │
│              │  Built-in, MCP, WASM │                          │
│              └──────────────────────┘                          │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Core Components

Component Purpose
Agent Loop Main message handling and job coordination
Router Classifies user intent (command, query, task)
Scheduler Manages parallel job execution with priorities
Worker Executes jobs with LLM reasoning and tool calls
Orchestrator Container lifecycle, LLM proxying, per-job auth
Web Gateway Browser UI with chat, memory, jobs, logs, extensions, routines
Routines Engine Scheduled (cron) and reactive (event, webhook) background tasks
Workspace Persistent memory with hybrid search
Safety Layer Prompt injection defense and content sanitization

Usage

Engine v2 is opt-in right now. If you want to run the new engine instead of the legacy agent loop, start IronClaw with ENGINE_V2=true. See Engine v2 architecture for more details.

# First-time setup (configures database, auth, etc.)
ironclaw onboard

# Start interactive REPL
cargo run

# Start interactive REPL with engine v2
ENGINE_V2=true cargo run

# Engine v2 with debug logging
ENGINE_V2=true RUST_LOG=ironclaw=debug cargo run

Development

# Format code
cargo fmt

# Lint
cargo clippy --all --benches --tests --examples --all-features

# Run tests
createdb ironclaw_test
cargo test

# Run specific test
cargo test test_name
  • Channels: See docs/channels/overview.mdx for setup of Telegram, Discord, and other channels.
  • Changing channel sources: Run ./channels-src/telegram/build.sh before cargo build so the updated WASM is bundled.

OpenClaw Heritage

IronClaw is a Rust reimplementation inspired by OpenClaw. See FEATURE_PARITY.md for the complete tracking matrix.

Key differences:

  • Rust vs TypeScript - Native performance, memory safety, single binary
  • WASM sandbox vs Docker - Lightweight, capability-based security
  • PostgreSQL vs SQLite - Production-ready persistence
  • Security-first design - Multiple defense layers, credential protection

License

Licensed under either of:

at your option.

Description
IronClaw is OpenClaw inspired implementation in Rust focused on privacy and security IronClaw 基于一个简单的原则:你的 AI 助手应该为你服务,而不是与你为敌。
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