* fix(security): add decompressed size limits to ZIP-based document extraction The document extraction pipeline (DOCX, PPTX, XLSX) opened ZIP archives and read individual entries fully into memory with read_to_string() without any decompressed size limit. While a 10 MB limit (MAX_DOCUMENT_SIZE) was enforced on the compressed input, a zip bomb — a small compressed file that expands to an extremely large decompressed size — could pass the input check but decompress to gigabytes of XML, causing an OOM condition that crashes all active sessions. ZIP achieves compression ratios of 1000:1+ for repetitive XML data. A 10 MB compressed file could decompress to 10+ GB. The existing MAX_EXTRACTED_TEXT_LEN trim (100K chars) is applied after all entries are fully decompressed, so it cannot prevent the OOM. Changes: - Add bounded_read_zip_entry() helper that checks the declared uncompressed size of each entry against MAX_DECOMPRESSED_ENTRY (50 MB) and tracks cumulative size against MAX_DECOMPRESSED_TOTAL (100 MB) - Use take() as defense-in-depth against archives that lie about their entry sizes - Apply bounded reads to all three extractors: extract_pptx, extract_xlsx, and extract_office_xml (used by DOCX) - Add regression tests verifying bounded reads work correctly Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): track actual decompressed bytes, not ZIP header metadata Address review feedback on #2093: - bounded_read_zip_entry now tracks actual bytes read (xml.len()) instead of trusting the ZIP header's declared uncompressed size - Fail closed when bounded reader hits the per-entry cap - Regression tests now exercise real rejection boundaries: actual byte accounting, cross-entry accumulation, and budget exhaustion Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): use typed errors and pre-check cumulative budget in ZIP decompression Replace generic string errors with ExtractionError enum (TotalSizeLimitExceeded, EntryReadFailed) and add a pre-check that rejects entries whose header-declared size would exceed MAX_DECOMPRESSED_TOTAL before decompressing. The post-read check still uses actual bytes (xml.len()) so a lying header cannot bypass the cumulative limit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): add per-entry truncation tests and configurable limits for zip bomb defense Refactors bounded_read_zip_entry into a configurable inner function (bounded_read_zip_entry_with_limits) so tests can exercise the critical defense paths without creating 50MB fixtures. Adds EntryTooLarge error variant to distinguish per-entry vs cumulative limit violations. New tests: - Per-entry truncation/fail-closed path (the actual zip bomb defense) - Per-entry pre-check rejection on declared header size - Cumulative total budget exhaustion across multiple entries - Caller-level: extract_office_xml rejects oversized DOCX entry - Caller-level: extract_pptx rejects oversized slide Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: cargo fmt Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Wui <wui@Wui-Work-2.local> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
IronClaw
Your secure personal AI assistant, always on your side
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Philosophy • Features • Installation • Configuration • Security • Architecture
Philosophy
IronClaw is built on a simple principle: your AI assistant should work for you, not against you.
In a world where AI systems are increasingly opaque about data handling and aligned with corporate interests, IronClaw takes a different approach:
- Your data stays yours - All information is stored locally, encrypted, and never leaves your control
- Transparency by design - Open source, auditable, no hidden telemetry or data harvesting
- Self-expanding capabilities - Build new tools on the fly without waiting for vendor updates
- Defense in depth - Multiple security layers protect against prompt injection and data exfiltration
IronClaw is the AI assistant you can actually trust with your personal and professional life.
Features
Security First
- WASM Sandbox - Untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers with capability-based permissions
- Credential Protection - Secrets are never exposed to tools; injected at the host boundary with leak detection
- Prompt Injection Defense - Pattern detection, content sanitization, and policy enforcement
- Endpoint Allowlisting - HTTP requests only to explicitly approved hosts and paths
Always Available
- Multi-channel - REPL, HTTP webhooks, WASM channels (Telegram, Slack), and web gateway
- Docker Sandbox - Isolated container execution with per-job tokens and orchestrator/worker pattern
- Web Gateway - Browser UI with real-time SSE/WebSocket streaming
- Routines - Cron schedules, event triggers, webhook handlers for background automation
- Heartbeat System - Proactive background execution for monitoring and maintenance tasks
- Parallel Jobs - Handle multiple requests concurrently with isolated contexts
- Self-repair - Automatic detection and recovery of stuck operations
Self-Expanding
- Dynamic Tool Building - Describe what you need, and IronClaw builds it as a WASM tool
- MCP Protocol - Connect to Model Context Protocol servers for additional capabilities
- Plugin Architecture - Drop in new WASM tools and channels without restarting
Persistent Memory
- Hybrid Search - Full-text + vector search using Reciprocal Rank Fusion
- Workspace Filesystem - Flexible path-based storage for notes, logs, and context
- Identity Files - Maintain consistent personality and preferences across sessions
Installation
Prerequisites
- Rust 1.85+
- PostgreSQL 15+ with pgvector extension
- NEAR AI account (authentication handled via setup wizard)
Download or Build
Visit Releases page to see the latest updates.
Install via Windows Installer (Windows)
Download the Windows Installer and run it.
Install via powershell script (Windows)
irm https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.ps1 | iex
Install via shell script (macOS, Linux, Windows/WSL)
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw/releases/latest/download/ironclaw-installer.sh | sh
Install via Homebrew (macOS/Linux)
brew install ironclaw
Compile the source code (Cargo on Windows, Linux, macOS)
Install it with cargo, just make sure you have Rust installed on your computer.
# Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/nearai/ironclaw.git
cd ironclaw
# Build
cargo build --release
# Run tests
cargo test
For full release (after modifying channel sources), run ./scripts/build-all.sh to rebuild channels first.
Database Setup
# Create database
createdb ironclaw
# Enable pgvector
psql ironclaw -c "CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector;"
Configuration
Run the setup wizard to configure IronClaw:
ironclaw onboard
The wizard handles database connection, NEAR AI authentication (via browser OAuth),
and secrets encryption (using your system keychain). Settings are persisted in the
connected database; bootstrap variables (e.g. DATABASE_URL, LLM_BACKEND) are
written to ~/.ironclaw/.env so they are available before the database connects.
Alternative LLM Providers
IronClaw defaults to NEAR AI but supports many LLM providers out of the box. Built-in providers include Anthropic, OpenAI, GitHub Copilot, Google Gemini, MiniMax, Mistral, and Ollama (local). OpenAI-compatible services like OpenRouter (300+ models), Together AI, Fireworks AI, and self-hosted servers (vLLM, LiteLLM) are also supported.
Select your provider in the wizard, or set environment variables directly:
# Example: MiniMax (built-in, 204K context)
LLM_BACKEND=minimax
MINIMAX_API_KEY=...
# Example: OpenAI-compatible endpoint
LLM_BACKEND=openai_compatible
LLM_BASE_URL=https://openrouter.ai/api/v1
LLM_API_KEY=sk-or-...
LLM_MODEL=anthropic/claude-sonnet-4
See docs/capabilities/llm-providers.md for a full provider guide.
Security
IronClaw implements defense in depth to protect your data and prevent misuse.
WASM Sandbox
All untrusted tools run in isolated WebAssembly containers:
- Capability-based permissions - Explicit opt-in for HTTP, secrets, tool invocation
- Endpoint allowlisting - HTTP requests only to approved hosts/paths
- Credential injection - Secrets injected at host boundary, never exposed to WASM code
- Leak detection - Scans requests and responses for secret exfiltration attempts
- Rate limiting - Per-tool request limits to prevent abuse
- Resource limits - Memory, CPU, and execution time constraints
WASM ──► Allowlist ──► Leak Scan ──► Credential ──► Execute ──► Leak Scan ──► WASM
Validator (request) Injector Request (response)
Prompt Injection Defense
External content passes through multiple security layers:
- Pattern-based detection of injection attempts
- Content sanitization and escaping
- Policy rules with severity levels (Block/Warn/Review/Sanitize)
- Tool output wrapping for safe LLM context injection
Data Protection
- All data stored locally in your PostgreSQL database
- Secrets encrypted with AES-256-GCM
- No telemetry, analytics, or data sharing
- Full audit log of all tool executions
Architecture
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Channels │
│ ┌──────┐ ┌──────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ │
│ │ REPL │ │ HTTP │ │WASM Channels│ │ Web Gateway │ │
│ └──┬───┘ └──┬───┘ └──────┬──────┘ │ (SSE + WS) │ │
│ │ │ │ └──────┬──────┘ │
│ └─────────┴──────────────┴────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌─────────▼─────────┐ │
│ │ Agent Loop │ Intent routing │
│ └────┬──────────┬───┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌──────────▼────┐ ┌──▼───────────────┐ │
│ │ Scheduler │ │ Routines Engine │ │
│ │(parallel jobs)│ │(cron, event, wh) │ │
│ └──────┬────────┘ └────────┬─────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌─────────────┼────────────────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌───▼─────┐ ┌────▼────────────────┐ │
│ │ Local │ │ Orchestrator │ │
│ │Workers │ │ ┌───────────────┐ │ │
│ │(in-proc)│ │ │ Docker Sandbox│ │ │
│ └───┬─────┘ │ │ Containers │ │ │
│ │ │ │ ┌───────────┐ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ │Worker / CC│ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ └───────────┘ │ │ │
│ │ │ └───────────────┘ │ │
│ │ └─────────┬───────────┘ │
│ └──────────────────┤ │
│ │ │
│ ┌───────────▼──────────┐ │
│ │ Tool Registry │ │
│ │ Built-in, MCP, WASM │ │
│ └──────────────────────┘ │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Core Components
| Component | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Agent Loop | Main message handling and job coordination |
| Router | Classifies user intent (command, query, task) |
| Scheduler | Manages parallel job execution with priorities |
| Worker | Executes jobs with LLM reasoning and tool calls |
| Orchestrator | Container lifecycle, LLM proxying, per-job auth |
| Web Gateway | Browser UI with chat, memory, jobs, logs, extensions, routines |
| Routines Engine | Scheduled (cron) and reactive (event, webhook) background tasks |
| Workspace | Persistent memory with hybrid search |
| Safety Layer | Prompt injection defense and content sanitization |
Usage
Engine v2 is opt-in right now. If you want to run the new engine instead of the legacy agent loop, start IronClaw with ENGINE_V2=true. See Engine v2 architecture for more details.
# First-time setup (configures database, auth, etc.)
ironclaw onboard
# Start interactive REPL
cargo run
# Start interactive REPL with engine v2
ENGINE_V2=true cargo run
# Engine v2 with debug logging
ENGINE_V2=true RUST_LOG=ironclaw=debug cargo run
Development
# Format code
cargo fmt
# Lint
cargo clippy --all --benches --tests --examples --all-features
# Run tests
createdb ironclaw_test
cargo test
# Run specific test
cargo test test_name
- Channels: See docs/channels/overview.mdx for setup of Telegram, Discord, and other channels.
- Changing channel sources: Run
./channels-src/telegram/build.shbeforecargo buildso the updated WASM is bundled.
OpenClaw Heritage
IronClaw is a Rust reimplementation inspired by OpenClaw. See FEATURE_PARITY.md for the complete tracking matrix.
Key differences:
- Rust vs TypeScript - Native performance, memory safety, single binary
- WASM sandbox vs Docker - Lightweight, capability-based security
- PostgreSQL vs SQLite - Production-ready persistence
- Security-first design - Multiple defense layers, credential protection
License
Licensed under either of:
- Apache License, Version 2.0 (LICENSE-APACHE)
- MIT License (LICENSE-MIT)
at your option.
