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## I have read the [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/supabase/supabase/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) file. YES ## What kind of change does this PR introduce? Database migration — adds a table for collecting free-form product feedback submitted from Supabase interfaces (starting with the CLI and the MCP server), including support for deleting a submission via a server-issued token. ## What is the current behavior? There is no destination for feedback submitted from the CLI or MCP server. The existing `feedback` and `feedback_comments` tables are scoped to the docs feedback widget, so interface feedback would otherwise end up as ad-hoc GitHub issues — with no way to revoke something submitted by accident (e.g. a secret key pasted into the message). ## What is the new behavior? Adds `public.interfaces_feedback`: | Column | Type | Notes | | --- | --- | --- | | `id` | `bigint` identity | primary key (not exposed through the API) | | `created_at` | `timestamptz` | `not null default now()` | | `feedback` | `text` | `not null`, ≤ 1000 chars — the free-form feedback | | `delete_token` | `uuid` | server-generated, `unique not null`; authorizes deleting the row | | `user_agent` | `text` | ≤ 255 chars; interface + version, also identifies the source interface | | `user_id` | `text` | optional, ≤ 255 chars; unverified, interface-defined identifier | | `project_ref` | `text` | optional, ≤ 255 chars | | `metadata` | `jsonb` | ≤ 8 KB catch-all | **Submission** happens exclusively through a `SECURITY DEFINER` function, `submit_interfaces_feedback(...)`, which inserts the row and returns the server-generated `delete_token` exactly once. There is no insert grant or policy on the table itself, so clients cannot insert directly or supply their own token — the function is the only door. Execute is revoked from `PUBLIC` and granted to `anon` only (both statements matter: local and hosted databases have different default function ACLs). **Deletion** is a hard `DELETE` authorized by presenting the token in an `x-feedback-token` request header. RLS policies compare the row's `delete_token` against that header (`current_setting('request.headers', ...)`) — the URL filter is never the security boundary; a request without the matching header affects zero rows, even with no filter or someone else's token in the filter. Tokens never expire (the delete right shouldn't lapse). The header is cast to `uuid` and compared against the untransformed column, so lookups use the unique index on `delete_token` even for header-only reads; a malformed token header is rejected with a `400` (`22P02`), consistent with what a malformed URL filter value already returns. **Context gate (defense-in-depth)**: rows submitted with a `project_ref` and/or `user_id` additionally require the matching `x-feedback-project-ref` / `x-feedback-user-id` headers — on both reads and deletes — so a leaked bare token can neither read the submission text back nor remove the row. A `NULL` column imposes no requirement: context-free rows keep token-only behavior, and extra headers sent against them are ignored (this keeps clients that always send their current context from being locked out of rows submitted without it). These are client-supplied, unverified values, so the gate is a knowledge factor rather than an identity check; clients should persist `{delete_token, project_ref, user_id}` together at submit time and re-present them byte-exact (`project_ref`/`user_id` are compared as plain text). **Reads** are limited to `grant select (feedback, delete_token)` behind the same token-scoped policy: a token-holder can preview their own submission text before deleting and confirm the delete matched (`Prefer: count=exact` → `Content-Range: */1` vs `*/0`). No other columns are readable by any API role; `delete_token` needs select because PostgREST requires a WHERE clause on deletes and filter columns require select privilege. Verified locally via `supabase db reset` + the local REST API: token issuance, token-scoped preview and delete, zero-row results for missing/wrong/malformed tokens (including a victim's token in the filter without the header), the full context-gate matrix (project+user, project-only, and context-free rows, incl. lenient extra-header behavior), denied direct inserts and column reads, length caps enforced through the function, and no execute for `authenticated`. ## Additional context Linear tickets: [CLI-1946](https://linear.app/supabase/issue/CLI-1946), [CLI-1999](https://linear.app/supabase/issue/CLI-1999) The client-side flows (`supabase feedback add` / `feedback delete` in the CLI, and the MCP tool) land separately in their respective repos and will call the RPC / DELETE endpoint described above. Supersedes #48378 — recreated on a fresh git branch so that the Supabase preview branch used for testing this table isn't shared with unrelated work. <!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> ## Summary by CodeRabbit * **New Features** * Added support for collecting and storing feedback submitted through interfaces. * Feedback can include submission source, timestamps, user details, project references, and additional metadata. * Added secure feedback submission with controlled access to protect submitted information. * Added support for authorized feedback removal using a secure deletion token. * Added safeguards to validate feedback content and restrict access to permitted information. <!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai --> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>