Preserve trust boundaries during pulled follow-up

The pull brought the branch current with origin/main while replaying local follow-up work. Conflict resolution kept the roadmap/progress additions and integrated the runtime event/trust changes with upstream's newer surfaces.

The trust allowlist now treats worktree_pattern as an additional required predicate, including the missing-worktree case, so auto-trust cannot fall back to cwd-only matching when a worktree constraint was declared. The runtime formatting cleanup keeps clippy/fmt green after the merge.

Constraint: Local branch was 109 commits behind origin/main with dirty tracked follow-up work.

Rejected: Drop the autostash after conflict resolution | keeping it preserves a reversible safety backup for unrelated recovery.

Confidence: high

Scope-risk: moderate

Directive: Do not relax worktree_pattern matching without preserving the missing-worktree regression.

Tested: git diff --cached --check; cargo fmt -p runtime -- --check; cargo clippy -p runtime --all-targets -- -D warnings; cargo test -p runtime; cargo test --workspace; architect verification approved

Not-tested: Live tmux/worker auto-trust behavior outside unit/integration tests

rust/crates/runtime/src/bash.rs

@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ fn detect_and_emit_ship_prepared(command: &str) {
             actor: get_git_actor().unwrap_or_else(|| "unknown".to_string()),
             pr_number: None,
         };
-        let _event = LaneEvent::ship_prepared(format!("{}", now), &provenance);
+        let _event = LaneEvent::ship_prepared(format!("{now}"), &provenance);
         // Log to stderr as interim routing before event stream integration
         eprintln!(
             "[ship.prepared] branch={} -> main, commits={}, actor={}",
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ async fn execute_bash_async(
 ) -> io::Result<BashCommandOutput> {
     // Detect and emit ship provenance for git push operations
     detect_and_emit_ship_prepared(&input.command);
-    
+
     let mut command = prepare_tokio_command(&input.command, &cwd, &sandbox_status, true);
 
     let output_result = if let Some(timeout_ms) = input.timeout {

rust/crates/runtime/src/session_control.rs

@@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ impl SessionStore {
         let workspace_root = workspace_root.as_ref();
         // #151: canonicalize workspace_root for consistent fingerprinting
         // across equivalent path representations.
-        let canonical_workspace = fs::canonicalize(workspace_root)
-            .unwrap_or_else(|_| workspace_root.to_path_buf());
+        let canonical_workspace =
+            fs::canonicalize(workspace_root).unwrap_or_else(|_| workspace_root.to_path_buf());
         let sessions_root = data_dir
             .as_ref()
             .join("sessions")
@@ -158,10 +158,9 @@ impl SessionStore {
     }
 
     pub fn latest_session(&self) -> Result<ManagedSessionSummary, SessionControlError> {
-        self.list_sessions()?
-            .into_iter()
-            .next()
-            .ok_or_else(|| SessionControlError::Format(format_no_managed_sessions(&self.sessions_root)))
+        self.list_sessions()?.into_iter().next().ok_or_else(|| {
+            SessionControlError::Format(format_no_managed_sessions(&self.sessions_root))
+        })
     }
 
     pub fn load_session(

rust/crates/runtime/src/trust_resolver.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
 const TRUST_PROMPT_CUES: &[&str] = &[
     "do you trust the files in this folder",
     "trust the files in this folder",
@@ -8,24 +10,121 @@ const TRUST_PROMPT_CUES: &[&str] = &[
     "yes, proceed",
 ];
 
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+/// Resolution method for trust decisions.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
 pub enum TrustPolicy {
+    /// Automatically trust this path (allowlisted)
     AutoTrust,
+    /// Require manual approval
     RequireApproval,
+    /// Deny trust for this path
     Deny,
 }
 
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+/// Events emitted during trust resolution lifecycle.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
 pub enum TrustEvent {
-    TrustRequired { cwd: String },
-    TrustResolved { cwd: String, policy: TrustPolicy },
-    TrustDenied { cwd: String, reason: String },
+    /// Trust prompt was detected and is required
+    TrustRequired {
+        /// Current working directory where trust is needed
+        cwd: String,
+        /// Optional repo identifier
+        #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+        repo: Option<String>,
+        /// Optional worktree path
+        #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+        worktree: Option<String>,
+    },
+    /// Trust was resolved (granted)
+    TrustResolved {
+        /// Current working directory
+        cwd: String,
+        /// The policy that was applied
+        policy: TrustPolicy,
+        /// How the trust was resolved
+        resolution: TrustResolution,
+    },
+    /// Trust was denied
+    TrustDenied {
+        /// Current working directory
+        cwd: String,
+        /// Reason for denial
+        reason: String,
+    },
 }
 
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
+/// How trust was resolved.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
+pub enum TrustResolution {
+    /// Automatically granted due to allowlist
+    AutoAllowlisted,
+    /// Manually approved by user
+    ManualApproval,
+}
+
+/// Entry in the trust allowlist with pattern matching support.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct TrustAllowlistEntry {
+    /// Repository path or glob pattern to match
+    pub pattern: String,
+    /// Optional worktree subpath pattern
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub worktree_pattern: Option<String>,
+    /// Human-readable description of why this is allowlisted
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub description: Option<String>,
+}
+
+impl TrustAllowlistEntry {
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn new(pattern: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            pattern: pattern.into(),
+            worktree_pattern: None,
+            description: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn with_worktree_pattern(mut self, pattern: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+        self.worktree_pattern = Some(pattern.into());
+        self
+    }
+
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn with_description(mut self, desc: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+        self.description = Some(desc.into());
+        self
+    }
+}
+
+/// Configuration for trust resolution with allowlist/denylist support.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct TrustConfig {
-    allowlisted: Vec<PathBuf>,
-    denied: Vec<PathBuf>,
+    /// Allowlisted paths with pattern matching
+    pub allowlisted: Vec<TrustAllowlistEntry>,
+    /// Denied paths (exact or prefix matches)
+    pub denied: Vec<PathBuf>,
+    /// Whether to emit events for trust decisions
+    #[serde(default = "default_emit_events")]
+    pub emit_events: bool,
+}
+
+fn default_emit_events() -> bool {
+    true
+}
+
+impl Default for TrustConfig {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            allowlisted: Vec::new(),
+            denied: Vec::new(),
+            emit_events: true,
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 impl TrustConfig {
@@ -35,8 +134,14 @@ impl TrustConfig {
     }
 
     #[must_use]
-    pub fn with_allowlisted(mut self, path: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
-        self.allowlisted.push(path.into());
+    pub fn with_allowlisted(mut self, path: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+        self.allowlisted.push(TrustAllowlistEntry::new(path));
+        self
+    }
+
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn with_allowlisted_entry(mut self, entry: TrustAllowlistEntry) -> Self {
+        self.allowlisted.push(entry);
         self
     }
 
@@ -45,6 +150,147 @@ impl TrustConfig {
         self.denied.push(path.into());
         self
     }
+
+    /// Check if a path matches an allowlisted entry using glob patterns.
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn is_allowlisted(
+        &self,
+        cwd: &str,
+        worktree: Option<&str>,
+    ) -> Option<&TrustAllowlistEntry> {
+        self.allowlisted.iter().find(|entry| {
+            let path_matches = Self::pattern_matches(&entry.pattern, cwd);
+            if !path_matches {
+                return false;
+            }
+
+            match (&entry.worktree_pattern, worktree) {
+                (Some(wt_pattern), Some(wt)) => Self::pattern_matches(wt_pattern, wt),
+                (Some(_), None) => false,
+                (None, _) => true,
+            }
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Match a pattern against a path string.
+    /// Supports exact matching and glob patterns (* and ?).
+    fn pattern_matches(pattern: &str, path: &str) -> bool {
+        let pattern = pattern.trim();
+        let path = path.trim();
+
+        // Exact match
+        if pattern == path {
+            return true;
+        }
+
+        // Normalize paths for comparison
+        let pattern_normalized = pattern.replace("//", "/");
+        let path_normalized = path.replace("//", "/");
+
+        // Check if pattern is a path prefix (e.g., "/tmp/worktrees" matches "/tmp/worktrees/repo-a")
+        // This handles the common case of directory containment
+        if !pattern_normalized.contains('*') && !pattern_normalized.contains('?') {
+            // Prefix match: pattern is a directory that contains path
+            if path_normalized.starts_with(&pattern_normalized) {
+                let rest = &path_normalized[pattern_normalized.len()..];
+                // Must be exact match or continue with /
+                return rest.is_empty() || rest.starts_with('/');
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Check if pattern ends with wildcard (prefix match)
+        if pattern_normalized.ends_with("/*") {
+            let prefix = pattern_normalized.trim_end_matches("/*");
+            if let Some(rest) = path_normalized.strip_prefix(prefix) {
+                // Must either be exact match or continue with /
+                return rest.is_empty() || rest.starts_with('/');
+            }
+        } else if pattern_normalized.ends_with('*') && !pattern_normalized.contains("/*/") {
+            // Simple trailing * (not a path component wildcard)
+            let prefix = pattern_normalized.trim_end_matches('*');
+            if let Some(rest) = path_normalized.strip_prefix(prefix) {
+                return rest.is_empty() || !rest.starts_with('/');
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Check if pattern is a path component match (bounded by /)
+        if path_normalized
+            .split('/')
+            .any(|component| component == pattern_normalized)
+        {
+            return true;
+        }
+
+        // Check if pattern appears as a substring within a path component
+        // (e.g., "repo" matches "/tmp/worktrees/repo-a")
+        if path_normalized
+            .split('/')
+            .any(|component| component.contains(&pattern_normalized))
+        {
+            return true;
+        }
+
+        // Glob matching for patterns with ? or * in the middle
+        if pattern.contains('?') || pattern.contains("/*/") || pattern.starts_with("*/") {
+            return Self::glob_matches(&pattern_normalized, &path_normalized);
+        }
+
+        false
+    }
+
+    /// Simple glob pattern matching (? matches single char, * matches any sequence).
+    /// Handles patterns like /tmp/*/repo-* where * matches path components.
+    fn glob_matches(pattern: &str, path: &str) -> bool {
+        // Use recursive backtracking for proper glob matching
+        Self::glob_match_recursive(pattern, path, 0, 0)
+    }
+
+    fn glob_match_recursive(pattern: &str, path: &str, p_idx: usize, s_idx: usize) -> bool {
+        let p_chars: Vec<char> = pattern.chars().collect();
+        let s_chars: Vec<char> = path.chars().collect();
+
+        let mut p = p_idx;
+        let mut s = s_idx;
+
+        while p < p_chars.len() {
+            match p_chars[p] {
+                '*' => {
+                    // Try all possible matches for *
+                    p += 1;
+                    if p >= p_chars.len() {
+                        // * at end matches everything remaining
+                        return true;
+                    }
+                    // Try matching 0 or more characters
+                    for skip in 0..=(s_chars.len() - s) {
+                        if Self::glob_match_recursive(pattern, path, p, s + skip) {
+                            return true;
+                        }
+                    }
+                    return false;
+                }
+                '?' => {
+                    // ? matches exactly one character
+                    if s >= s_chars.len() {
+                        return false;
+                    }
+                    p += 1;
+                    s += 1;
+                }
+                c => {
+                    // Exact character match
+                    if s >= s_chars.len() || s_chars[s] != c {
+                        return false;
+                    }
+                    p += 1;
+                    s += 1;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Pattern exhausted - path must also be exhausted
+        s >= s_chars.len()
+    }
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
@@ -86,15 +332,19 @@ impl TrustResolver {
     }
 
     #[must_use]
-    pub fn resolve(&self, cwd: &str, screen_text: &str) -> TrustDecision {
+    pub fn resolve(&self, cwd: &str, worktree: Option<&str>, screen_text: &str) -> TrustDecision {
         if !detect_trust_prompt(screen_text) {
             return TrustDecision::NotRequired;
         }
 
+        let repo = extract_repo_name(cwd);
         let mut events = vec![TrustEvent::TrustRequired {
             cwd: cwd.to_owned(),
+            repo: repo.clone(),
+            worktree: worktree.map(String::from),
         }];
 
+        // Check denylist first
         if let Some(matched_root) = self
             .config
             .denied
@@ -112,15 +362,12 @@ impl TrustResolver {
             };
         }
 
-        if self
-            .config
-            .allowlisted
-            .iter()
-            .any(|root| path_matches(cwd, root))
-        {
+        // Check allowlist with pattern matching
+        if self.config.is_allowlisted(cwd, worktree).is_some() {
             events.push(TrustEvent::TrustResolved {
                 cwd: cwd.to_owned(),
                 policy: TrustPolicy::AutoTrust,
+                resolution: TrustResolution::AutoAllowlisted,
             });
             return TrustDecision::Required {
                 policy: TrustPolicy::AutoTrust,
@@ -128,6 +375,19 @@ impl TrustResolver {
             };
         }
 
+        // Check for manual trust resolution via screen text analysis
+        if detect_manual_approval(screen_text) {
+            events.push(TrustEvent::TrustResolved {
+                cwd: cwd.to_owned(),
+                policy: TrustPolicy::RequireApproval,
+                resolution: TrustResolution::ManualApproval,
+            });
+            return TrustDecision::Required {
+                policy: TrustPolicy::RequireApproval,
+                events,
+            };
+        }
+
         TrustDecision::Required {
             policy: TrustPolicy::RequireApproval,
             events,
@@ -135,17 +395,20 @@ impl TrustResolver {
     }
 
     #[must_use]
-    pub fn trusts(&self, cwd: &str) -> bool {
-        !self
+    pub fn trusts(&self, cwd: &str, worktree: Option<&str>) -> bool {
+        // Check denylist first
+        let denied = self
             .config
             .denied
             .iter()
-            .any(|root| path_matches(cwd, root))
-            && self
-                .config
-                .allowlisted
-                .iter()
-                .any(|root| path_matches(cwd, root))
+            .any(|root| path_matches(cwd, root));
+
+        if denied {
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        // Check allowlist using pattern matching
+        self.config.is_allowlisted(cwd, worktree).is_some()
     }
 }
 
@@ -172,11 +435,240 @@ fn normalize_path(path: &Path) -> PathBuf {
     std::fs::canonicalize(path).unwrap_or_else(|_| path.to_path_buf())
 }
 
+/// Extract repository name from a path for event context.
+fn extract_repo_name(cwd: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let path = Path::new(cwd);
+    // Try to find a .git directory to identify repo root
+    let mut current = Some(path);
+    while let Some(p) = current {
+        if p.join(".git").is_dir() {
+            return p.file_name().map(|n| n.to_string_lossy().to_string());
+        }
+        current = p.parent();
+    }
+    // Fallback: use the last component of the path
+    path.file_name().map(|n| n.to_string_lossy().to_string())
+}
+
+/// Detect if the screen text indicates manual approval was granted.
+fn detect_manual_approval(screen_text: &str) -> bool {
+    let lowered = screen_text.to_ascii_lowercase();
+    // Look for indicators that user manually approved
+    MANUAL_APPROVAL_CUES.iter().any(|cue| lowered.contains(cue))
+}
+
+const MANUAL_APPROVAL_CUES: &[&str] = &[
+    "yes, i trust",
+    "i trust this",
+    "trusted manually",
+    "approval granted",
+];
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod path_matching_tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn glob_pattern_star_matches_any_sequence() {
+        assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches("/tmp/*", "/tmp/foo"));
+        assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches("/tmp/*", "/tmp/bar/baz"));
+        assert!(!TrustConfig::pattern_matches("/tmp/*", "/other/tmp/foo"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn glob_pattern_question_matches_single_char() {
+        assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches("/tmp/test?", "/tmp/test1"));
+        assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches("/tmp/test?", "/tmp/testA"));
+        assert!(!TrustConfig::pattern_matches("/tmp/test?", "/tmp/test12"));
+        assert!(!TrustConfig::pattern_matches("/tmp/test?", "/tmp/test"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn pattern_matches_exact() {
+        assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
+            "/tmp/worktrees",
+            "/tmp/worktrees"
+        ));
+        assert!(!TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
+            "/tmp/worktrees",
+            "/tmp/worktrees-other"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn pattern_matches_prefix_with_wildcard() {
+        assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
+            "/tmp/worktrees/*",
+            "/tmp/worktrees/repo-a"
+        ));
+        assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
+            "/tmp/worktrees/*",
+            "/tmp/worktrees/repo-a/subdir"
+        ));
+        assert!(!TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
+            "/tmp/worktrees/*",
+            "/tmp/other/repo"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn pattern_matches_contains() {
+        // Pattern contained within path
+        assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
+            "worktrees",
+            "/tmp/worktrees/repo-a"
+        ));
+        assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
+            "repo",
+            "/tmp/worktrees/repo-a"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn allowlist_entry_with_worktree_pattern() {
+        let config = TrustConfig::new().with_allowlisted_entry(
+            TrustAllowlistEntry::new("/tmp/worktrees/*")
+                .with_worktree_pattern("*/.git")
+                .with_description("Git worktrees"),
+        );
+
+        // Should match when both patterns match
+        assert!(config
+            .is_allowlisted("/tmp/worktrees/repo-a", Some("/tmp/worktrees/repo-a/.git"))
+            .is_some());
+
+        // Should not match when worktree pattern doesn't match
+        assert!(config
+            .is_allowlisted("/tmp/worktrees/repo-a", Some("/other/path"))
+            .is_none());
+
+        // Should not match when a worktree pattern is required but no worktree is supplied
+        assert!(config
+            .is_allowlisted("/tmp/worktrees/repo-a", None)
+            .is_none());
+
+        // Should match when no worktree pattern required and path matches
+        let config_no_worktree = TrustConfig::new().with_allowlisted("/tmp/worktrees/*");
+        assert!(config_no_worktree
+            .is_allowlisted("/tmp/worktrees/repo-a", None)
+            .is_some());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn allowlist_entry_returns_matched_entry() {
+        let entry = TrustAllowlistEntry::new("/tmp/worktrees/*").with_description("Test worktrees");
+        let config = TrustConfig::new().with_allowlisted_entry(entry.clone());
+
+        let matched = config.is_allowlisted("/tmp/worktrees/repo-a", None);
+        assert!(matched.is_some());
+        assert_eq!(
+            matched.unwrap().description,
+            Some("Test worktrees".to_string())
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn complex_glob_patterns() {
+        // Multiple wildcards
+        assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
+            "/tmp/*/repo-*",
+            "/tmp/worktrees/repo-123"
+        ));
+        assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
+            "/tmp/*/repo-*",
+            "/tmp/other/repo-abc"
+        ));
+        assert!(!TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
+            "/tmp/*/repo-*",
+            "/tmp/worktrees/other"
+        ));
+
+        // Mixed ? and *
+        assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
+            "/tmp/test?/*.txt",
+            "/tmp/test1/file.txt"
+        ));
+        assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
+            "/tmp/test?/*.txt",
+            "/tmp/testA/subdir/file.txt"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn serde_serialization_roundtrip() {
+        let config = TrustConfig::new()
+            .with_allowlisted_entry(
+                TrustAllowlistEntry::new("/tmp/worktrees/*")
+                    .with_worktree_pattern("*/.git")
+                    .with_description("Git worktrees"),
+            )
+            .with_denied("/tmp/malicious");
+
+        let json = serde_json::to_string(&config).expect("serialization failed");
+        let deserialized: TrustConfig =
+            serde_json::from_str(&json).expect("deserialization failed");
+
+        assert_eq!(config.allowlisted.len(), deserialized.allowlisted.len());
+        assert_eq!(config.denied.len(), deserialized.denied.len());
+        assert_eq!(config.emit_events, deserialized.emit_events);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn trust_event_serialization() {
+        let event = TrustEvent::TrustRequired {
+            cwd: "/tmp/test".to_string(),
+            repo: Some("test-repo".to_string()),
+            worktree: Some("/tmp/test/.git".to_string()),
+        };
+
+        let json = serde_json::to_string(&event).expect("serialization failed");
+        assert!(json.contains("trust_required"));
+        assert!(json.contains("/tmp/test"));
+        assert!(json.contains("test-repo"));
+
+        let deserialized: TrustEvent = serde_json::from_str(&json).expect("deserialization failed");
+        match deserialized {
+            TrustEvent::TrustRequired {
+                cwd,
+                repo,
+                worktree,
+            } => {
+                assert_eq!(cwd, "/tmp/test");
+                assert_eq!(repo, Some("test-repo".to_string()));
+                assert_eq!(worktree, Some("/tmp/test/.git".to_string()));
+            }
+            _ => panic!("wrong event type"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn trust_event_resolved_serialization() {
+        let event = TrustEvent::TrustResolved {
+            cwd: "/tmp/test".to_string(),
+            policy: TrustPolicy::AutoTrust,
+            resolution: TrustResolution::AutoAllowlisted,
+        };
+
+        let json = serde_json::to_string(&event).expect("serialization failed");
+        assert!(json.contains("trust_resolved"));
+        assert!(json.contains("auto_allowlisted"));
+
+        let deserialized: TrustEvent = serde_json::from_str(&json).expect("deserialization failed");
+        match deserialized {
+            TrustEvent::TrustResolved { resolution, .. } => {
+                assert_eq!(resolution, TrustResolution::AutoAllowlisted);
+            }
+            _ => panic!("wrong event type"),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::{
-        detect_trust_prompt, path_matches_trusted_root, TrustConfig, TrustDecision, TrustEvent,
-        TrustPolicy, TrustResolver,
+        detect_manual_approval, detect_trust_prompt, path_matches_trusted_root,
+        TrustAllowlistEntry, TrustConfig, TrustDecision, TrustEvent, TrustPolicy, TrustResolution,
+        TrustResolver,
     };
 
     #[test]
@@ -197,7 +689,7 @@ mod tests {
         let resolver = TrustResolver::new(TrustConfig::new().with_allowlisted("/tmp/worktrees"));
 
         // when
-        let decision = resolver.resolve("/tmp/worktrees/repo-a", "Ready for your input\n>");
+        let decision = resolver.resolve("/tmp/worktrees/repo-a", None, "Ready for your input\n>");
 
         // then
         assert_eq!(decision, TrustDecision::NotRequired);
@@ -213,23 +705,23 @@ mod tests {
         // when
         let decision = resolver.resolve(
             "/tmp/worktrees/repo-a",
+            None,
             "Do you trust the files in this folder?\n1. Yes, proceed\n2. No",
         );
 
         // then
         assert_eq!(decision.policy(), Some(TrustPolicy::AutoTrust));
-        assert_eq!(
-            decision.events(),
-            &[
-                TrustEvent::TrustRequired {
-                    cwd: "/tmp/worktrees/repo-a".to_string(),
-                },
-                TrustEvent::TrustResolved {
-                    cwd: "/tmp/worktrees/repo-a".to_string(),
-                    policy: TrustPolicy::AutoTrust,
-                },
-            ]
-        );
+        let events = decision.events();
+        assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+        assert!(matches!(events[0], TrustEvent::TrustRequired { .. }));
+        assert!(matches!(
+            events[1],
+            TrustEvent::TrustResolved {
+                policy: TrustPolicy::AutoTrust,
+                resolution: TrustResolution::AutoAllowlisted,
+                ..
+            }
+        ));
     }
 
     #[test]
@@ -240,6 +732,7 @@ mod tests {
         // when
         let decision = resolver.resolve(
             "/tmp/other/repo-b",
+            None,
             "Do you trust the files in this folder?\n1. Yes, proceed\n2. No",
         );
 
@@ -249,6 +742,8 @@ mod tests {
             decision.events(),
             &[TrustEvent::TrustRequired {
                 cwd: "/tmp/other/repo-b".to_string(),
+                repo: Some("repo-b".to_string()),
+                worktree: None,
             }]
         );
     }
@@ -265,6 +760,7 @@ mod tests {
         // when
         let decision = resolver.resolve(
             "/tmp/worktrees/repo-c",
+            None,
             "Do you trust the files in this folder?\n1. Yes, proceed\n2. No",
         );
 
@@ -275,6 +771,8 @@ mod tests {
             &[
                 TrustEvent::TrustRequired {
                     cwd: "/tmp/worktrees/repo-c".to_string(),
+                    repo: Some("repo-c".to_string()),
+                    worktree: None,
                 },
                 TrustEvent::TrustDenied {
                     cwd: "/tmp/worktrees/repo-c".to_string(),
@@ -284,6 +782,66 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn auto_trusts_with_glob_pattern_allowlist() {
+        // given
+        let resolver = TrustResolver::new(TrustConfig::new().with_allowlisted("/tmp/worktrees/*"));
+
+        // when - any repo under /tmp/worktrees should auto-trust
+        let decision = resolver.resolve(
+            "/tmp/worktrees/repo-a",
+            None,
+            "Do you trust the files in this folder?\n1. Yes, proceed\n2. No",
+        );
+
+        // then
+        assert_eq!(decision.policy(), Some(TrustPolicy::AutoTrust));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn resolve_with_worktree_pattern_matching() {
+        // given
+        let config = TrustConfig::new().with_allowlisted_entry(
+            TrustAllowlistEntry::new("/tmp/worktrees/*").with_worktree_pattern("*/.git"),
+        );
+        let resolver = TrustResolver::new(config);
+
+        // when - with worktree that matches the pattern
+        let decision = resolver.resolve(
+            "/tmp/worktrees/repo-a",
+            Some("/tmp/worktrees/repo-a/.git"),
+            "Do you trust the files in this folder?\n1. Yes, proceed\n2. No",
+        );
+
+        // then - should auto-trust because both patterns match
+        assert_eq!(decision.policy(), Some(TrustPolicy::AutoTrust));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn manual_approval_detected_from_screen_text() {
+        // given
+        let resolver = TrustResolver::new(TrustConfig::new());
+
+        // when - screen text indicates manual approval
+        let decision = resolver.resolve(
+            "/tmp/some/repo",
+            None,
+            "Do you trust the files in this folder?\nUser selected: Yes, I trust this folder",
+        );
+
+        // then - should detect manual approval
+        assert_eq!(decision.policy(), Some(TrustPolicy::RequireApproval));
+        let events = decision.events();
+        assert!(events.len() >= 2);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            events[events.len() - 1],
+            TrustEvent::TrustResolved {
+                resolution: TrustResolution::ManualApproval,
+                ..
+            }
+        ));
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn sibling_prefix_does_not_match_trusted_root() {
         // given
@@ -296,4 +854,70 @@ mod tests {
         // then
         assert!(!matched);
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn detects_manual_approval_cues() {
+        assert!(detect_manual_approval(
+            "User selected: Yes, I trust this folder"
+        ));
+        assert!(detect_manual_approval(
+            "I trust this repository and its contents"
+        ));
+        assert!(detect_manual_approval("Approval granted by user"));
+        assert!(!detect_manual_approval(
+            "Do you trust the files in this folder?"
+        ));
+        assert!(!detect_manual_approval("Some unrelated text"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn trust_config_default_emit_events() {
+        let config = TrustConfig::default();
+        assert!(config.emit_events);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn trust_resolver_trusts_method() {
+        let resolver = TrustResolver::new(
+            TrustConfig::new()
+                .with_allowlisted("/tmp/worktrees/*")
+                .with_denied("/tmp/worktrees/bad-repo"),
+        );
+
+        // Should trust allowlisted paths
+        assert!(resolver.trusts("/tmp/worktrees/good-repo", None));
+
+        // Should not trust denied paths
+        assert!(!resolver.trusts("/tmp/worktrees/bad-repo", None));
+
+        // Should not trust unknown paths
+        assert!(!resolver.trusts("/tmp/other/repo", None));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn trust_policy_serde_roundtrip() {
+        for policy in [
+            TrustPolicy::AutoTrust,
+            TrustPolicy::RequireApproval,
+            TrustPolicy::Deny,
+        ] {
+            let json = serde_json::to_string(&policy).expect("serialization failed");
+            let deserialized: TrustPolicy =
+                serde_json::from_str(&json).expect("deserialization failed");
+            assert_eq!(policy, deserialized);
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn trust_resolution_serde_roundtrip() {
+        for resolution in [
+            TrustResolution::AutoAllowlisted,
+            TrustResolution::ManualApproval,
+        ] {
+            let json = serde_json::to_string(&resolution).expect("serialization failed");
+            let deserialized: TrustResolution =
+                serde_json::from_str(&json).expect("deserialization failed");
+            assert_eq!(resolution, deserialized);
+        }
+    }
 }